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TAX EXPERIMENTATION
Michael Abramowicz*
Abstract
Random experiments could allow the government to test tax policies
before they are enacted into general law. Such experiments can be
revenue-neutral, with the tax authority ensuring ex post that average tax
revenues received from taxpayers in the treatment and control groups are
equal. Taxpayers might thus volunteer even for experiments that would
broaden the tax base, for example by eliminating deductions. Continued
participation by taxpayers in such experiments would indicate that the
proposed reforms are efficient at least if externalities are disregarded.
Non-revenue-neutral experiments raise greater concerns about horizontal
inequity, but they may be helpful in addressing questions about effects
of tax rates and in increasing participation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 is an experiment on a grand scale.
If, as critics claim, the statute encourages expensive tax avoidance
strategies that will lead to even lower tax revenues than projected,2 the

1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. The bill was entitled
the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” until right before it passed, when the Senate parliamentarian ruled
that the title violated the Byrde rule. Eli Watkins, Senate Rules Force Republicans to Go with
Lengthy Name for Tax Plan, CNN (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/19/politics/taxbill-name-delay/index.html [https://perma.cc/D8TZ-4XJZ]. As a result, the final bill was entitled
“An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on
the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Id. Most commentators continue to refer to the bill as the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (or TCJA). See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper et al., Eyes Turn Toward 2018 Tasks
as Tax Reform Becomes Law, 158 TAX NOTES 28, 28 (2018) (referring to “[t]he law, known
informally as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97)”); Amy Hamilton, Connecticut Finds a
SALT Workaround That Would Actually Work, 158 TAX NOTES 1328, 1328 (2018) (referring
without qualification to the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”).
2. See generally David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks,
and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423 [https://perma.cc/MEG6-AHKK]
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inefficiencies and budget strains3 will be national in scope. The
experiment has no control group. If the economy grows rapidly over the
next few years, reform proponents will likely take credit, while critics
will insist that the economic growth was exogenous.4 Both sides will
make their case with anecdotal evidence rather than with the results of
randomized experiments that economists generally prefer.5 Scholars have
identified an empirical deficit in tax scholarship,6 but because federal tax
law exhibits little exogenous variation,7 the deficit is difficult to correct.8
This Article describes an approach to tax reform that might have been,
and that might still be, an experimental approach—in which proposed
reforms are tested initially on groups of willing taxpayers. In recent years,
legal literature has focused attention on the design9 and justifiability10 of
randomized government policy in areas including consumer protection,11
(identifying numerous mechanisms that taxpayers may use to avoid taxes as a result of the tax
reform).
3. The official estimate of the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on
Taxation is that the tax changes will cause an increase in deficits of $1.8 trillion over ten years.
See Letter from Keith Hall, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Ron Wyden, Sen. (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53437 [https://perma.cc/NW9Q-CQST].
4. Economists had different estimates of the efficiency consequences of the last large tax
reform. See Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 589, 619–20 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy
Research, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 64 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito II et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of U.S.
Tax Court Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523, 526 (2011) (“Many authors have noted the
absence of empirical research in tax law . . . .”); Nancy Staudt, Empirical Taxation, 13 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2003) (“[T]he literature gives legislators little guidance for selecting one
proposal from another in the wide array of sound policy options.”).
7. The exceptional rigorous analyses of changes in federal law prove the rule. Ed Fox, for
example, analyzes the effect of federal tax law on marriage by exploiting differences in state laws
that led the federal law to apply differently in different states at the same time. See generally
Edward Fox, Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History (Law & Econ. Res. Paper Ser.,
Working Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988559
[https://perma.cc/HW8V-7TBK].
8. The deficit may also exist in part because tax law professors prefer theory to empirics.
See Staudt, supra note 6, at 2 (“[F]ew attempt to test whether their hypotheses hold true in the real
world.”). But even in a conference on tax empiricism, none of the papers directly assessed the
effects of federal law. See id. at 5–8 (describing the contributions). With greater policy variation,
especially random variation, scholarship would likely follow.
9. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 974
(2011).
10. See generally Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”:
Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035 (2015) (discussing justifications for randomized
government policy).
11. See Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based
Policy, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 38 (2015).
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securities law,12 patent law,13 and even regulation of food safety.14
Randomized experiments produce the best attainable evidence of legal
policies’ effect on behavior, but the only known tax-related randomized
experiments involve tax procedure15 and welfare,16 not substantive tax
law. Interest in the behavioral effects of tax law on taxpayers pervades
the literature,17 but there has been virtually no consideration of whether
tax law itself might benefit from systematic randomized experiments.18
Tax law is a promising field in which the government might run
randomized experiments. The large number of taxpayers should make it
possible to find voluntary treatment groups that are small relative to the
population yet large enough to generate statistical power.19 Each tax
change would apply to a random selection of qualified taxpayers agreeing
to opt into the experiment, thus producing both a treatment group and a
control group still subject to the status quo law. Experiments might test
multiple tax law changes, disentangling any resulting interaction effects
when individual taxpayers are in multiple treatment groups.20
Meanwhile, tax experiments could be much cheaper than many other
form of legal experimentation because the existing obligation to file tax
12. See Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558
(2015).
13. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 (2015).
14. See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2017).
15. See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., READYRETURN PILOT TAX YEAR 2004
STUDY RESULTS 2 (2006) (reporting results of an experiment on sending taxpayers pre-filled
returns), https://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/TY04RRFinalReport.pdf. But the survey reported
no results on perhaps the most interesting question, whether control group taxpayers paid more or
less tax than treatment group taxpayers. Id. at 29–30 (comparing treatment group taxpayers
reported state and federal income, but ignoring control group taxpayers); cf. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Intuit’s Nine Lies Kill State E-Filing Programs and Keep ‘Free’ File Alive, 57 ST. TAX NOTES
555, 559 (2010) (arguing that taxpayers using ReadyReturn paid no more taxes than others, but
without any comparisons between taxpayers and control group to support this argument).
16. See I DAVID KERSHAW & JERILYN FAIR, THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-MAINTENANCE
EXPERIMENT: OPERATIONS, SURVEYS, AND ADMINISTRATION 3 (1976).
17. See, e.g., William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L
TAX J. 375 (2009).
18. A rare exception is the following single sentence: “Conceivably, field experiments
could be designed where individuals are randomly assigned to different tax schedules in the spirit
of the older negative income tax experiments in the United States.” Emmanuel Saez et al., The
Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON.
LIT. 3, 43 (2012) (referring to experiments mentioned infra note 24 and accompanying text).
19. See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL.
SCI. 98, 98 (1992) (noting that statistical power depends on sample size, amongst other variables).
20. See generally JAMES JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE
REGRESSION (2d ed. 2003) (describing techniques for identifying interactions between multiple
variables of interests).
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forms21 provides the government much of the evidence that it might need
to assess the effects of an experiment.
A plausible explanation for the lack of attention to tax
experimentation lies in tax law’s core value of horizontal equity.22 This
value makes especially salient the concern that experiments necessarily
produce unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals. Randomly
assigning some taxpayers to a tax law change violates horizontal equity
because those taxpayers would then be treated differently from similarly
situated taxpayers not so assigned. This concern diminishes if the
treatment is a tax break. Randomized government experiments offering
benefits are widely considered ethical,23 and random experiments
granting low-income individuals benefits have occurred.24 Experiments
often offer the treatment group something denied to the control group. In
medical experiments, some patients who hope for a new treatment instead
receive a placebo.25 If uncertainty about relative efficacy suffices to
justify medical experiments,26 then legal experiments should be similarly
defensible.
There are, however, problems with tax experiments limited to tax
breaks. First, experimentation becomes a one-way ratchet, always
expected to lower tax revenues. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act increases
deficits,27 so future policymakers may need to raise more revenue, not
select further tax breaks. Second, tax policy questions susceptible to
experimentation often involve trade-offs, for example, whether taxpayers
might be better off with higher rates but more deductions. Third,
21. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6012 (West 2018) (specifying who must file U.S. federal tax returns).
22. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (“There is virtual unanimity that horizontal equality, treating
equals equally, is a worthy goal of any tax system.”).
23. See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 968 (“[W]hen scarce resources are
distributed, randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in a way that
limits rent-seeking . . . .”). For a detailed treatment of ethical issues in social experiments, see
generally THE BROOKINGS INST., ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice
M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975).
24. See, e.g., KERSHAW & FAIR, supra note 16, at 8.
25. The use of a placebo was initiated by Austin Flint in 1862. See AUSTIN FLINT, A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE 1019–20 (4th ed. 1873).
26. The literature on research ethics suggests that experiments are permissible where
practitioners are in “clinical equipoise” about the best course of treatment. See Franklin G. Miller
& Howard Brody, Clinical Equipoise and the Incoherence of Research Ethics, 32 J. MED. & PHIL.
151, 152 (2007). A critique is that a doctor’s individualized obligation is not to choose among
treatments at random, but to choose a treatment thought to be best given available information for
each individual patient. Id. at 156 (arguing that clinical equipoise is an incoherent theory and that
ethical obligations in research are distinct from those in clinical settings).
27. See Letter from Keith Hall, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Ron Wyden, Sen., supra note
3.
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taxpayers opting in to tax experiments will generally be well advised and
wealthy,28 so experimentation on tax breaks will often be inherently
regressive.
These concerns, however, reflect a fallacy. If treatment group
taxpayers benefit relative to the control group, then it might seem that all
other taxpayers lose. After all, if some pay less revenue to the
government, then others bear a higher proportion of taxation’s overall
burden. But taxpayers in the treatment group might benefit while paying
the same level of tax on average as taxpayers in the control group. Many
proposals for tax reform purport to correct inefficiencies in the tax code.
Changes that remove economic distortions could be combined with rate
changes in ways that would improve taxpayer welfare while maintaining
government revenue.
This observation leads to the following insight: Tax experiments can
be revenue neutral by design.29 The treatment group in such an
experiment, on average, pays taxes as high as those paid by the control
group. Revenue neutrality substantially addresses the problems above. A
revenue-neutral experiment is not a one-way ratchet. Instead, it allows
questions of economic efficiency to be assessed independent of
normative questions about overall tax levels and the distribution of the
tax burden across income and other groups.30 Revenue-neutral
experiments necessarily allow the government to assess the impact of
trade-offs. Even if only relatively wealthy taxpayers opted into these
experiments, they would be guaranteed to pay as much in taxes as they
would absent experimentation. Participating taxpayers anticipate
benefiting from the trade-offs embodied by experimentation, but not at
the direct expense of other taxpayers. Their experience, moreover, may
help generate tax reform of broader benefit.
28. The government has sought to address this concern by providing grants for Low Income
Taxpayer Clinics. See Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/advocate/lowincome-taxpayer-clinics [https://perma.cc/D62E-DZZB] (last updated July 12, 2018).
29. Commentators have often suggested that tax reform should be revenue neutral. See, e.g.,
Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1200 (2017) (“In the current
fiscal environment, it is widely accepted that any tax reform should not lose any
revenue. . . . Revenue-neutrality is particularly relevant in base-broadening reform . . . .”). But
revenue neutrality has not been discussed in connection with experimentation.
30. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will result
in a lower percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively high incomes and
a higher percentage of total tax revenues being paid by those with relatively low incomes by 2027.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-68-17, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 5 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=5054 (projecting, for example, that taxpayers with income
of $1,000,000 and over will contribute 18.9% of total taxes, instead of 19.1% of total taxes under
prior law).
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What combination of tax changes might serve as the subject of a tax
experiment? Consider, as a simple (at the risk of being trivial) illustration,
the recent tax reform’s limitations on the deductibility of entertainment
expenses.31 Under prior law, taxpayers could deduct expenses such as
tickets for a sporting event used to entertain a client,32 but taxpayers can
no longer do so.33 A longstanding argument for restricting deductibility
of such expenses is that taxpayers derive utility from such expenditures.34
Because the recipient of entertainment benefits generally need not
include the benefits in income,35 deductibility immunizes such
expenditures from taxation.36
Limitations on the entertainment deduction might seem a poor
candidate for experimentation because no one would volunteer for
increased tax liability. Whatever the act’s overall merits, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act demonstrates the political palatability of bundling taxpayerunfriendly changes with taxpayer-friendly changes: A limitation on
deductibility was joined to a rate reduction.37 The entertainmentdeduction limits recouped only a tiny fraction of the revenue loss from
other parts of the tax bill.38 But the lobbyists’ embrace—or at least
31. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2018) (“No deduction otherwise allowable under this
chapter shall be allowed for any item . . . [w]ith respect to an activity which is of a type generally
considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation . . . .”).
32. Entertainment expenses were deductible if they were “directly related to” or “associated
with” the taxpayer’s trade or business. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (2012); Walliser v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.
433, 441–43 (1979) (finding otherwise deductible entertainment expenses failed both “directly
related to” and “associated with” tests).
33. See I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2018).
34. President Kennedy expressed this argument clearly: “Even though in some instances
entertainment and related expenses have an association with the needs of business, they
nevertheless confer substantial tax-free personal benefits to the recipients.” President’s 1961 Tax
Recommendations: Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in His
Message Transmitted to the Congress Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong. 12–
13 (1961).
35. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(3), (d) (2012) (excluding fringe benefits from employee’s gross
income when the expenditures would have been deductible by the employee if paid by the
employee herself); United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 120, 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that taxpayer had no gross income from travel and apparent entertainment expenses provided by
automobile manufacturer who wanted taxpayer to open a dealership).
36. The issues raised by the entertainment deduction arise as well with other potentially
deductible expenses, such as expenses for meals, home offices, and education. For an early reform
proposal accounting for these connections, see Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for
Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859,
859 & n.1, 862–63 (1974).
37. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
38. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s limitation on meal and entertainment expenses was
estimated by the nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation to raise $23.5 billion over the ten-year
budget window. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
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grudging acceptance—of this tax reform, as opposed to a reform that
lowered rates less with no change to entertainment expense deductibility,
suggests that the deduction was distortionary. It is hard to tell for sure.39
But the example conceptually demonstrates that taxpayers should
embrace revenue-neutral tax changes that remove decision-making
distortions.
How might an experiment on entertainment deductibility have
worked? Taxpayers could have volunteered to give up their entertainment
deductions. The carrot to induce participation would be that these
taxpayers receive lower rates, rates just low enough that government tax
revenues would be identical. If the government selected the rate, it might
miscalculate or intentionally set the rate low, disguising a tax cut as an
experiment.40 But there is a simple antidote: The law authorizing such
experiments could provide that the total tax liability of treatment group
taxpayers be multiplied by a factor sufficient to ensure that revenues from
these taxpayers equal, in the aggregate, the revenues that they would have
paid, as extrapolated from payments by control group taxpayers. For
example, if the average treatment group taxpayer’s liability, when
measured after limiting interest deductions, would have been 1% more
than the average control group taxpayer’s liability, then each treatment
group taxpayer might be given approximately a 1% discount on the
nominal reported tax liability, calculated without granting the
entertainment deduction.41
With so simple a formula for achieving revenue neutrality, the
taxpayers most likely to opt in would be those that in the absence of the
experiment would claim a relatively small entertainment deduction
anyway. This would be unfortunate, as the greatest tax distortion
presumably involves taxpayers who take large entertainment deductions.
But a more sophisticated approach could calculate a custom multiplier for
each participant. A statistical model developed after the experiment
would feature ex ante attributes of the treatment and control group
taxpayers, including previous entertainment expenses, as independent
variables. The model would predict total tax liability reported by both
control and treatment group taxpayers during the experimental period. If
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 4 (2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
39. The combination of large corporation tax rate reductions with limitations on certain
business deductions might be attributed to a political motive to highlight large reductions, if those
reductions are greater in salience than the deduction limitations.
40. Cf. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M. P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded
Savings Accounts, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1148 (2006) (criticizing purported tax reform proposals
as “amount[ing] to little more than a disguised tax cut for high-income individuals”).
41. More precisely, the tax payment multiplier would be (100 / 101) to ensure revenue
neutrality, so the discount is approximately 0.99%.
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the model predicted that a taxpayer would have liability 3% higher if
assigned to the control group, then the taxpayer would receive
approximately a 3% tax rate reduction on the nominal reported tax
liability if assigned to treatment. A treatment taxpayer’s entertainment
expenditures would not reduce tax liability, and the taxpayer therefore
would have incentives to reduce entertainment expenditures on the
margin.
This approach can also be used to experiment on the possibility of new
deductions. For example, current tax law does not allow taxpayers to
deduct commuting expenses.42 Commuting expenses may be seen either
as enabling taxpayers to travel to work or as enabling taxpayers to live
away from work, so the normative case for deductibility is close.43 An
experiment might test deductibility for all or only in limited
circumstances, such as for commuting to an employer located far from
affordable housing. Treatment group taxpayers would receive the
deduction offered but would pay higher tax rates to maintain revenue
neutrality relative to the control group. This could facilitate efficient
behavioral changes, for example leading a taxpayer to work for an
employer further away.44 Or, the experiment might fail, suggesting the
efficiency of the status quo.
Revenue-neutral tax experiments cannot answer all normative
questions about tax law changes. First, these experiments assess
efficiency only. A full normative analysis should embrace distributional
concerns as well, which have received increased attention as inequality
nationally has widened.45 Nonetheless, the practice of revenue-neutral
experimentation could promote attention to distributional issues. Some
critics of the recent tax law changes argue that these changes amounted
to a regressive tax cut disguised as tax reform.46 Experimentation could
generate relatively uncontroversial tax reform measures, reducing the
need for omnibus tax reform packages focused on efficiency. A tax
package featuring untested or rejected efficiency measures might face
42. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012); Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473–74 (1946).
43. See generally Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 201–34 (2006)
(analyzing policy arguments); Ronald S. Ross, Should Deductible Commuting Be Contingent on
Principal-Place-of-Business Criteria?, 83 J. TAX’N 88 (1995) (summarizing legal developments
and arguments).
44. This argument is strongest if the taxpayer’s residence is effectively fixed. See William
A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic
Analysis of “Simple” Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 880 (1969).
45. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20 (2017)
(documenting increased inequality within nations).
46. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, You Cannot Be Too Cynical About the Republican Tax Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/opinion/republican-tax-billtrump-corker.html [https://perma.cc/X3AU-4X6D].
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criticism. Experimentation could thus foster a policy culture in which
distributional issues are considered directly and acknowledged as policy
choices rather than assumed to be inevitable epiphenomena of other tax
policies.47
Second, the experimental approach assumes that taxpayers internalize
benefits of tax law provisions, but tax provisions may be motivated by
anticipated third-party effects. For example, the mortgage interest tax
deduction is purportedly motivated by a desire to provide incentives for
home ownership, which supposedly generates positive externalities.48
Many scholars are skeptical of this justification,49 but the experimental
approach that this Article describes does not provide a means for
measuring such externalities or their absence. It might, however, be
possible to design an experiment that can overcome this concern by
experimenting at a level other than that of a taxpayer. For example, a
homeowner’s association might be allowed to opt in on behalf of all
owners of homes in the association. If one assumes that this level
internalizes externalities, then the willingness of such associations to
participate would suggest that the benefits of the proposed treatment
exceed the costs.
Third, revenue-neutral experiments cannot easily assess the
macroeconomic consequences of changes in tax rates. Revenue neutrality
would undo an isolated tax rate change. Proponents justify important
features of the recent tax reform, such as the reduction in corporate tax
rates50 and the allowance of reduced rates for certain passthrough
income,51 on the ground that they may improve the overall economic
climate, thus benefiting workers as well as owners of capital.52 Nonrevenue-neutral tax experiments may thus be needed.53 For example, the
47. Robert Shiller has proposed that the government specify in advance the maximum level
of inequality. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY
149–64 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON. 354, 383 (1999) (finding evidence that
homeownership causes greater investment in social capital).
49. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 207 (2009); Stephanie M. Stern,
Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 890–96 (2011).
50. I.R.C. 11(b) (Supp. V 2018) (cutting corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%).
51. Id. § 199A.
52. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Corporate Tax Incidence Made Simple,
157 TAX NOTES 454, 456 (2017) (providing overview of the evidence that cutting corporate tax
rates may, to some extent, benefit workers).
53. MARK P. KNIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41596, THE MORTGAGE INTEREST AND
PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 8–11 (2014) (reviewing the literature on
whether the home mortgage interest deduction creates positive externalities to justify the tax
benefit).
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government might have selected random taxpayers to receive a 1% tax
reduction in passthrough income and assessed the effects of such a
reduction. Such experiments can provide information beyond the power
of revenue-neutral tax experiments, at the cost of more serious horizontal
equity objections. Without the revenue-neutrality constraint, the
government can also grant inducements to tax experiment participants,
such as a promise that treatment taxpayers will pay on average less than
control taxpayers. Such inducements could reduce concerns about
adverse selection and enable experiments with treatment groups covering
many reforms.54
With non-revenue-neutral experiments, success must be based on
defined criteria, such as whether treatment businesses hire more
employees. With opt-in revenue-neutral experiments, success can be
measured based on the willingness of taxpayers to opt in, once early
experimental periods produce information about the likely trade-offs.
Such experiments can do little harm. At worst, only a few taxpayers,
potentially unrepresentative, will participate, and the experiment will
never scale up. If the experiment does scale, taxpayers would come to
learn what tax rate discount or increase they might expect in exchange
for the new tax treatment. Unless virtually all taxpayers wish to be part
of an experiment, the government should be cautious in making an
experiment permanent because opting-in taxpayers are self-selected. The
government therefore might transition gradually, by making an opt-in
experiment opt-out and then ultimately mandatory.55 Alternatively, the
government might allow all taxpayers to opt into the treatment group,
without requiring it of any taxpayers.
Part I of this Article will describe revenue-neutral tax experiments in
more detail, illustrating how they can be used to assess a wide range of
tax policies. Part II will identify challenges for revenue-neutral
experimentation, including scaling up experiments, addressing concerns
about horizontal and vertical equity, countering the danger of taxpayer
manipulation, and testing tax expenditures and other policies with goals
beyond efficiency. Finally, Part III will consider non-revenue-neutral
experiments. It will explain how such experiments can induce greater
participation on a wider range of issues and can study the effect of
changing marginal tax rates. It also describes the possibility of selfexecuting tax experiments, in which the law automatically will change in
a direction indicated by the experimental results, and experiments in
which individual taxpayers are not the unit of experimentation.

54. See infra Section III.A.
55. See infra Section II.A.
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I. REVENUE-NEUTRAL TAX EXPERIMENTS
This Part discusses how the government might use revenue-neutral tax
experiments to assess the efficiency of various features of the tax code.
The approaches described here might be used by the U.S. federal
government, by state or local governments, or by foreign governments.
Thus, while this Article will use provisions from the Internal Revenue
Code and recent tax reform statutes and proposals as examples, its
analysis is not dependent on the structure of the U.S. income tax system.
Section I.A elaborates the entertainment deduction experiment discussed
in the introduction, and Section I.B describes other potential tax
experiments.
A. A Hypothetical Experiment
The goal of revenue-neutral tax experimentation is to identify
potential sets of changes to tax law that in combination would provide the
government the same amount of revenue but that would reduce distortion
of economic activity. This section elaborates how an experiment might
have tested the ultimately adopted reform of removing the entertainment
expenses deduction.
1. The Potential Benefit to Taxpayers
Why might a taxpayer be interested in the combination of tax rate
reduction and loss of the deduction, assuming the taxpayer anticipates
paying around the same amount as before? Consider a taxpayer with
gross income of $110,000, a tax rate of 25%,56 and $10,000 in certain
entertainment expenses deductible under what we will assume is current
law. Further, suppose that this taxpayer receives $8,000 in subjective
value from these expenses. That is, the taxpayer would be equally happy
if the taxpayer could reallocate the $10,000 entertainment expenses to
$2,000 in taxes and $8,000 in cash. In the table below, this is listed as
Scenario 1. Of course, not all taxpayers would value $83,000 in takehome pay as much as $75,000 plus $10,000 in entertainment expenses,
but some might. The immediate burden is not to show that a revenueneutral change would be good for all taxpayers, just that it might be good
for some.

56. These numbers are chosen to make the math easy, not to reflect the intricacies of the
tax code. A more realistic example would take into account factors such as the standard deduction.
See I.R.C. § 63(c) (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (allowing taxpayers to deduct a fixed amount of money
in lieu of itemizing deductions).
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Table 1. Hypothetical effects of an experiment

Status
quo
Scenario
1
Scenario
2

Gross
Income

Entertainment
Expenses

Taxable
Income

Tax
Rate

Taxes

Take
Home
Income

$110K

$10K

$100K

25%

$25K

$75K

$110K

$0

$110K

24.5%

$27K

$83K

$108K

$2K

$106K

23.5%

$25K

$81K

This scenario illustrates that a tax law change can make the
government better off (receiving $2,000 more in revenue) while making
a taxpayer no worse off. Though such tax changes are a plausible policy
goal, a taxpayer would have no incentive to take the trouble to opt into
such an experiment. The fact that this tax law change produces a surplus
of $2,000, however, suggests that it is possible to imagine a tax law
change that could make this hypothetical taxpayer better off and the
government no worse off. Consider, for example, Scenario 2. Here,
assume that the taxpayer spends $2,000 on entertainment and this
reduction in spending leaves the taxpayer with only $108,000 in gross
income. With a 23.5% tax rate, the taxpayer pays $25,000 in taxes,
leaving the taxpayer with $81,000 in take home income. Some taxpayers
might prefer this to the status quo. If not, then the experiment would
simply fail.
2. Adjustments to Ensure Revenue Neutrality
The sizes of the treatment and control groups could be equal, but that
is not necessary. The advantage of using an equal number of taxpayers in
each group is that this provides the greatest statistical power.57 If either
group is sufficiently small, then any differences between the two groups
are more likely to be attributable to noise. On the other hand, placing most
opting-in taxpayers in the treatment group maximizes the number who
may receive their preferred tax treatment. For ease of exposition,
however, this Article will assume that the groups are the same size.
The simplest technique for achieving revenue neutrality would be to
calculate the quotient of the total taxes paid by the control group divided
by the total taxes calculated by the treatment group, prior to applying a
multiplier. Each taxpayer in the treatment group would then pay taxes
57. For a proof, see Hugh, Answer to Sample Size proportion per control vs. experiment
group, STACK EXCHANGE (Mar. 5, 2017, 11:01 PM) https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/
265622/sample-size-proportion-per-control-vs-experiment-group [https://perma.cc/F24K-96H4].
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equal to the amount the taxpayer reported, multiplied by this quotient.
Suppose, for example, that the control group taxpayers paid a total of $1
billion in taxes, and the treatment group taxpayers reported a total of
$1.04 billion in taxes. (A higher tax bill would be expected for this
experiment, since the experiment is removing what we assume was a
deduction available under current law.) Then, a treatment group taxpayer
who had $100,000 in gross income would have reported $25,000 in taxes,
regardless of the amount of entertainment expenses that the taxpayer
incurred. Tax liability, however, would be only $25,000 * (1 / 1.04), or
around $24,000.
This approach to calculating the tax multiple enhances the likelihood
that treatment group taxpayers will respond in the same way as they
would if there were a broader change in tax law affecting all taxpayers.
A taxpayer in the control group has experienced no legal change at all
and thus should presumably behave in the same way as the taxpayer
would have if the experiment had never occurred.58 This is assuming, of
course, that the experiment is large enough that each member of the
treatment group will have only a negligible effect on the tax ratio. If one
imagined the opposite—an experiment with two taxpayers, one in the
treatment group and one in the control group—then the treatment
taxpayer would expect his own tax liability to be equal to that of the
control group taxpayer, and the treatment taxpayer would behave as if a
lump sum tax would be imposed.59 The law of large numbers is essential
not only for statistical validity, but also because revenue neutrality means
that the tax liability of each treatment group participant depends on all
other participants’ tax returns.60
Calculating a single ratio for all taxpayers is not the best approach.
Taxpayers with low levels of entertainment deductions would be
especially likely to opt in. The ratio of taxes paid by taxpayers in the
control and treatment groups would then be close to 1. Those with large
entertainment deductions would thus opt out. The tax authority must
calculate a different ratio for each treatment taxpayer, based on how
placement in the control or treatment group affected taxpayers with
similar characteristics. A simple version along these lines would be to
define subgroups of taxpayers. A group, for example, might consist of all
taxpayers from a particular industry with a particular level of income and
58. Below, this Article will consider the caveat that the treatment group’s tax change might
have some indirect effect on the control group. See infra Section I.A.4.
59. This is not entirely a bad result. Economists generally assume that lump sum taxes are
the least distortionary. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J.
PUB. ECON. 213, 217 (1982).
60. In a relatively small experiment, the government might calculate the ratio separately for
each treatment group taxpayer—that is, making the ratio equal to the average tax reported of all
taxpayers in the control group divided by the average tax reported of all taxpayers in the treatment
group other than the taxpayer affected.
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entertainment deductions from the year prior. This group would then be
subdivided into treatment and control, and the same ratio would be used
for all taxpayers in this subgroup.
A more sophisticated, yet still easily implementable, approach would
use multivariate regression analysis. The government would estimate two
regressions, one for the treatment group and one for the control group.
Each would predict reported income after the experiment as a function of
variables from past years’ tax returns. The precise form of the regression
does not matter much for this Article’s purposes; a simple multiple linear
regression model might work well,61 or the government might perform a
nonlinear regression62 or even use machine learning techniques, such as
a neural network regression63 or a decision forest.64 The government can
thus calculate for each treatment taxpayer the ratio between the tax bill
that would be expected if the taxpayer were in the control group divided
by the expected unadjusted tax bill if in the treatment group. The ratio
does not depend on the level of entertainment deductions or income
claimed by the taxpayer in the treatment year. If the sum of liability
applying this ratio does not produce precisely the revenue-neutral
amount, then all treatment taxpayers’ liability could be multiplied by a
constant to ensure exact revenue neutrality.
The taxpayers would be informed of the ratio calculated at the end of
the experiment and would receive a corresponding adjustment in liability.
If the treatment taxpayers are entitled to a discount as a result, they would
receive interest on the money for the period the government held it.65 In
a reverse experiment where taxpayers eventually pay more, if the
taxpayers underestimated their final liability, they might pay interest, just
as a taxpayer who is responsible for quarterly estimated tax payments
may be required to pay interest when the quarterly payments are too
low.66 If final reconciliation of the experiment takes a while, for example
because some taxpayers fail to file their tax returns on time,67 the
government could make an initial adjustment a few months after the
61. See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION: A PRIMER (1st ed. 1998)
(discussing multiple linear regression models).
62. See generally GEORGE A.F. SEBER & C.J. WILD, NONLINEAR REGRESSION (2003)
(discussing nonlinear regression).
63. See generally, e.g., Donald F. Specht, A General Regression Neural Network, 2 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL NETWORKS 568 (1991) (discussing neural network regression).
64. See generally, e.g., Weida Tong et al., Decision Forest: Combining the Predictions of
Multiple Independent Decision Tree Models, 43 J. CHEM. INF. COMP. SCI. 525 (2003) (proposing
the decision forest model).
65. The IRS often pays interest on overpayments. See I.R.C. § 6611 (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
66. I.R.C. § 6654 (2012).
67. Taxpayers who file late must pay penalties. I.R.C. § 6651 (2012 & Supp. V 2018). Such
penalties, excluding interest, could be included in the comparison between the treatment and
control group, to account for the possibility that the tax regime may affect the timeliness of filing.
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relevant taxable year and then a final adjustment some time later. If
finality is more important than exact revenue neutrality, this final
adjustment could be scheduled to come sooner rather than later.
These timing details aside, the statistical approach reduces the risk
that because of adverse selection, those who opt into the experiment are
those with characteristics that make them relatively immune to the tax
law change at issue. Such taxpayers could still opt in, but if the relevant
characteristics are captured by the model, then it would predict that these
taxpayers’ liability would not change much, and so the effect of the
experiment on these taxpayers would be small. This does not solve the
adverse selection problem completely, however. The independent
variables are an incomplete list of factors that might affect taxpayers, and
taxpayers can be expected to have private information about their future
behavior.68 A taxpayer who plans to reduce his entertainment deductions
for reasons not apparent based on available data would be particularly
likely to opt in.
3. Evaluation of Experimental Success
How can the government assess whether an experiment was
successful? One question is whether the experiment led to behavioral
changes among taxpayers. That might be discerned from tax returns filed,
particularly if taxpayers in the control group are required to report the
same data that they would have reported if they were in the treatment
group, even if that data is no longer relevant in computing their tax
liability. In this example, treatment group taxpayers might reduce their
entertainment expenses. If entertainment expenses declined but gross
income did not, then that would indicate that entertainment expenses in
fact are largely not legitimate business expenses. More generally, the
ratio of the decline in entertainment expenses to the decline in gross
income provides a proxy for the success of the experiment. It is not
obvious, however, what level marks the cutoff between success and
failure, particularly because what matters is the marginal effect of the tax
reduction on gross income.69
This possibility highlights two points. First, even when tax rules are
conventionally framed as binary choices, they often simply reflect polar
points on the spectrum. This is more obvious in the context of
entertainment deductions than in many areas of tax law because
68. See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012)
(discussing the importance of asymmetric information to tax policy analysis).
69. See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue
Code, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 947 (2016) (“A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, in contrast to a
taxpayer’s average tax rate, is an effective indicator of how the Internal Revenue Code affects a
taxpayer’s decisions.”).
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businesses have long been allowed only partial deduction of certain
classes of entertainment expenses.70 Ideally, a process of experimentation
might lead the government to home in on the efficient level of permissible
deductibility. Second, it will not always be straightforward to interpret an
experiment to determine whether it was successful or not, even as to the
taxpayers who opted in.71 Therefore, the strongest indication that a tax
change is efficient as to the taxpayers in the experiment is the mere fact
that the taxpayers opted into the experiment. So long as an experiment is
revenue neutral, taxpayers’ willingness to opt into the experiment
suggests that it is expected to leave the taxpayers better off, with no
adverse consequences for the Treasury. Continued demand from
taxpayers to participate in subsequent iterations of the experiment would
strengthen this inference.
The inference, however, carries caveats. First, the experiment’s
success may not be generalizable to taxpayers who do not opt in. This
highlights the question of how the government can scale up an
experiment, a question to which we will soon return.72 Second, the
efficiency of a tax experiment may depend not only on the effects of the
tax on the taxpayers, but also the effect of the tax on third parties. In the
context of the entertainment deduction, for example, this analysis has so
far overlooked the clients who would have been wined and dined but no
longer received such benefits. Any loss of utility that these clients suffer
might count as a negative effect on social welfare. Or perhaps the effect
is positive, if entertainment expenses represent kickbacks that distort
decisions of economic agents,73 especially if public officials receive
benefits.74 The lower the effects on third parties, the stronger the case that
a revenue-neutral tax reform will be welfare neutral as to nonparticipants.
4. Enhancement of Experimental Interpretability
An additional caveat is that experimental subjects may behave
differently than they would if they faced the same tax rules but outside
an experimental context. This problem arises in medical experiments
when participants may be able to deduce which group they are in.75 In
70. I.R.C. § 274(n) (Supp. V 2018) (disallowing 50% of the deduction for most meal
expenses).
71. Cf. infra Section II.A (considering generalizing experiments beyond initial participants).
72. See infra Section II.A.
73. See LEONARD J. BROOKS & PAUL DUNN, BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR
DIRECTORS, EXECUTIVES & ACCOUNTANTS 388 (7th ed. 2015).
74. A taxpayer may not deduct business expense payments made in violation of state or
federal law. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (2012).
75. See, e.g., Jefferson M. Fish, The Trouble with Double-Blind Placebo Studies, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Nov. 23, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/looking-in-the-cultural-
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social experiments, it is impossible to conceal group assignments.
Taxpayers can respond to the economic incentives of a tax change only
if they are aware of it, so there can be no placebo group.76
“Hawthorne effects” occur when members of the treatment group
behave differently because they know that they are in an experiment.77
Subjects might, in a tax experiment, focus more on the relevant tax issue,
giving it outsized importance. Or subjects might be regret averse;78 that
is, they wish to avoid feeling regret for the decision that they have already
made to opt into the experiment.79 In the entertainment deduction
experiment, an exaggerated cutback on entertainment expenses reduces
the risk that the taxpayer will find out that the taxpayer would have been
better off with status quo law.
Meanwhile, “John Henry effects” occur when subjects in the control
group behave differently than they would outside an experiment.80
Annoyed at not being assigned to treatment, some might increase their
entertainment expenses, so that they can profit by deducting even more
than they would have. Or, they might cut back on such expenses, figuring
they were planning to before being assigned to control. Determining
which scenario is more likely is an exercise in speculative psychology.
The premise of tax experimentation is that when taxpayers are faced with
direct economic incentives, the treatment group’s behavioral responses
are direct results of those incentives. But at least on the margins,
psychological considerations related to the experimental setting may play
a role.
A related but distinct concern is that group assignment might affect
taxpayers’ reporting of their behavior. Control group taxpayers might
decide to be more honest in reporting their entertainment deductions
because they worry (even if falsely) that government investigators will
be more likely to find fraud. Or, miffed at being assigned to control, such
mirror/201011/the-trouble-double-blind-placebo-studies [https://perma.cc/XET7-FVM7] (noting
that patients often can determine whether a pill is a placebo or biologically active).
76. Double-blind medical experiments typically include three groups: a control group, a
placebo group, and a treatment group. See, e.g., id.
77. See Stephen R. G. Jones, Was There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 452–53
(1992) (describing experiments in which such effects were claimed).
78. See generally Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory
of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982) (defining evidence for regret
aversion).
79. For example, litigants may accept settlement offers because they wish to avoid the
possibility of regret should they do worse at trial. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The
Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the
Measurement of Self Esteem in Primary Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools,
36 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 87, 99 (1991) (describing an observed John Henry effect).
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taxpayers might take shortcuts in reporting. Meanwhile, even if reporting
is required for individuals in the treatment group and they face liability
for misreporting,81 treated taxpayers might reason that their entertainment
deductions no longer factor into their tax liability and thus not bother to
collect all the underlying data. Or, they might reason that because the
reported expense values will not reduce their liability, they might as well
overreport to avoid any possible sanction for misreporting.
The tax authority might adopt various approaches to addressing these
issues. The first and most plausible is simply to ignore them. The tax
authority’s principal job is to produce summary data to inform taxpayers,
who can then make their own assessments of experimental results in
deciding whether to opt in for future years. If the ultimate measure of a
revenue-neutral tax experiment’s success is demand to receive the tax
treatment, then what matters is simply that the government report the data
accurately. If, however, the goal is to enable both the tax authority and
the taxpayer to make informed rather than speculative decisions, then
some other approaches may be necessary if Hawthorne or John Henry
effects are expected to be large. The following subsections will consider
other approaches that will make experiments easier to interpret.
a. Varying the Treatment
An alternative strategy for reducing the magnitude of Hawthorne and
John Henry effects is to define a range of treatment groups. 82 For
example, the experiment might feature eleven groups, with one receiving
no deduction, one receiving 10% deductibility, and so forth. The group
receiving the full deductibility allowed under current law would be the
control group, and it might be larger than each other group.83 Hawthorne
and John Henry effects seem likely to be most pronounced at the
extremes, when a taxpayer concludes that he is in the control or receiving
the full treatment. Some components of Hawthorne or John Henry effects
might gradually increase with the treatment level, but this approach
would at least isolate the components of these effects that emerge at the
extremes. An extrapolation of the trend between 10% and 90% to the

81. Ordinarily, tax law imposes no penalty on taxpayers who fail to file, but through
withholdings have overpaid their tax, because penalties are based on the size of the deficiency.
See Patronik-Holder v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. 374, 380 (1993).
82. This is often described as a dose-response design. See WILLIAM M. HOLMES, USING
PROPENSITY SCORES IN QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 17–18 (2014).
83. See, e.g., Simon Bate & Natasha A. Karp, A Common Control Group—Optimising the
Experiment Design to Maximise Sensitivity, 9 PLOS ONE, Dec. 11, 2014, at 1, 9, https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4263717/pdf/pone.0114872.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4LU-CKV3]
(showing that with multiple treatments, sensitivity for comparison with the control is maximized
with a larger control group).
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extremes might be a more reliable gauge for policy than the extremes
themselves.
Eleven is not a magic number. Taxpayers could be assigned to a
smaller or larger number of groups. Revenue neutrality, however, must
be retained. One strategy for achieving this with multiple treatment
groups would be to calculate multipliers based on the performance of
each treatment group individually, comparing to the single control group.
But unless the number of taxpayers is very large, the multiplier levels
might be noisy, influenced by randomness within the control group or a
particular treatment group. Even if the control group and a treatment
group as a whole are representative, a particular taxpayer might be
matched84 through regression to a relatively small number of taxpayers
in the treatment group who had higher or lower than expected
performance for reasons having nothing to do with the experiment.
An alternative approach would be to develop a single integrated
regression model that allows a taxpayer’s expected income, given prior
years’ data, to be estimated based on the degree of deductibility. The
regression might include a term representing the degree of deductibility
allowed, along with a square and perhaps a cube of that term. The
regression would also include all other variables from previous years’ tax
data that allowed for multipliers to vary within the treatment group in the
proposal.85 Each non-control taxpayer’s multiplier would then be
calculated as the taxpayer’s expected tax level if full deductibility were
allowed, divided by the taxpayer’s expected unadjusted tax level given
the actual level of deductibility allowed.
Allowing for a wide range of treatment levels has an additional
potential benefit beyond helping to highlight Hawthorne and John Henry
effects: It may help identify tax changes where the optimum exists
somewhere between the extremes. Perhaps the optimal degree of
deductibility for entertainment expenses is somewhere between 0% and
100% because spending money on entertainment generally provides
some consumption value but also contributes to taxpayers’ income. On
the other hand, if an experiment seems to suggest a result relatively near
the zero-deductibility extreme, there may be a strong argument for tax
law to move all the way to that extreme, namely that eliminating

84. The term “matching” is often used in statistics to refer to a particular experimental
design that is an alternative to regression, in which baseline characteristics are used to divide
subjects into treatment-control pairs. See generally, e.g., Ruta Brazauskas & Brent R. Logan,
Observational Studies: Matching or Regression?, 22 BIOLOGY BLOOD MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION 557 (2016) (discussing this experimental concept). Whatever design is used,
taxpayers will be affected by those with similar characteristics.
85. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
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deductibility altogether is likely to reduce transaction costs.86 If for
political or transaction-costs reasons the law seems likely to settle at an
extreme,87 no matter the experimental results, then an experiment that
simply compares a control group and a single treatment group may
provide for a cleaner comparison.
b. Two-Level Randomization
With two-level randomization, the government first identifies
taxpayers for whom the alternative regime might be appropriate. Then
the government randomly selects a subset of these eligible taxpayers to
be invited to opt in. Some taxpayers invited will decline. Of those who
do opt in, some fraction must be randomly assigned to the control group,
while others are subject to the alternative tax regime.
Figure 1 illustrates these different groups.
Figure 1. Two-Level Randomization

Two-level randomization affords two levels of comparison. As before,
the government can compare nominal tax liability from those taxpayers
subject to the alternative regime (i.e., those shaded gray in Figure 1) to
tax revenues from the control group. But now, the government can also
compare the tax returns of those taxpayers who were not invited to opt
in, despite being eligible, to the tax returns of all taxpayers who were
86. For a discussion of transactions costs in the tax system, see Kneave Riggal,
Comprehensive Tax Base Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Efficiency: How to Tax Our
Way to Efficiency, 17 VA. TAX REV. 295, 307–08 (1997).
87. The current treatment of entertainment expenses is at the extreme of complete
disallowance. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) (Supp. V 2018). But meals with clients are 50% deductible. Id.
§ 274(n).
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invited to opt in. Suppose, for example, that control group taxpayers seek
to make up for the misfortune of being placed in the control group by
working harder. This would be unfortunate for the members of the
treatment group, who would receive less of a tax discount than they
otherwise would, making the experiment seem less successful than it in
fact was. The larger comparison might identify this behavior.
It may seem counterintuitive to make a comparison involving many
taxpayers not participating in the experiment. One can, however, think of
the eligible-but-invited taxpayers as serving as a control group of a sort
for the treatment of being invited to participate in the experiment. Even
assuming that being invited to participate has no direct effect on
behavior,88 Hawthorne and John Henry effects can be seen as indirect
effects of being invited into the experiment. Two-level randomization
allows for measurement of these indirect effects, which are likely to be
more attenuated than the effect of being chosen for the treatment group
but less susceptible to the Hawthorne and John Henry problems.
Two-level randomization thus might help allow better interpretation
of experiments. But if two-level randomization is used, the results also
could be used to calculate a second multiplier that would then be used to
achieve more accurate revenue neutrality. A simple approach would be
to multiply the treatment group’s total tax bills by a constant, applied on
top of the original multiplier, to ensure that the average tax revenues
received from those invited to the experiment are equal to the average tax
revenues received from those eligible but not invited. This would assure
potential participants in a tax experiment that their ultimate tax liability
will not be affected by John Henry or Hawthorne effects arising from the
division into treatment and control groups. Alternatively, a multiplier
might apply to both the treatment and control group, or even to all
taxpayers invited into the experiment. Such an application might be
justified on the ground of horizontal equity, but it would effectively
punish control group taxpayers who work harder as a result of John Henry
effects or reward those who work less hard as a result.
The tax adjustments to achieve revenue neutrality could be even more
sophisticated. A separate multiple regression could model the eligiblebut-uninvited taxpayers. The government would then be able to calculate
the expected tax liability of each member of the treatment group if that
member had not been invited to participate. This allows for an
individualized second multiplier to be calculated for each treatment group
member. A third multiplier could then be applied to all treatment group
participants to achieve revenue neutrality. Arguably, however, such
88. If the experiment is well-known even among those not invited, the nonreceipt of an
invitation might affect behavior. This can produce a sort of John Henry effect of its own. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text. But these effects seem likely to be smaller than the effects
on those who have taken the affirmative step of trying to opt in.
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adjustments may make the system too opaque. Thus, the tax authority
reasonably might seek to achieve revenue neutrality only with the first
layer of multipliers, even if using two-level randomization. At least, that
might make sense in early experimentation on experimentation. If large
discrepancies between eligible-but-uninvited taxpayers and invited
taxpayers emerged, then such refinements might be necessary.
c. Intent-to-Treat Randomization
Yet another approach would be for the government to conduct just a
single layer of randomization, but for that layer of randomization to be at
the invitation stage. The tax authority would invite only some eligible
taxpayers to participate but then allow all taxpayers who volunteer for the
experiment to receive the alternative tax regime. This approach is
appropriate if there is relatively little reason to worry that merely being
offered or denied the alternative regime will change taxpayer behavior.
The approach may be useful if it is seen as undesirable to randomly pick
a taxpayer to participate in an experiment but then assign the taxpayer to
the control group. A standard statistical methodology called “intent to
treat” can be used to determine the statistical significance of the results,
comparing results of those offered the treatment (eligible and invited
taxpayers) with those not offered it (eligible but not invited), taking into
account that many may decline the treatment.89 Revenue neutrality could
then be achieved with a simple multiplier applied to all invited and
opting-in taxpayers, set at a level ensuring that revenues are equal among
invited and not-invited taxpayers.
B. Other Revenue-Neutral Tax Experiments
This section considers a variety of other possible tax experiments,
including tax experiments affecting what is deductible, experiments on
the definition of income, experiments on tax procedure, and radical tax
experiments exploring significant structural changes to the structure of
taxation.

89. See Vikrant K. Bubbar & Hans J. Kreder, The Intention-to-Treat Principle: A Primer
for the Orthopaedic Surgeon, 88 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2097, 2099 (2006).
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1. Deductions
Experiments could test both disallowing what otherwise would be
deductions and allowing deductibility where it otherwise would not be
possible.
a. Disallowing Other Deductions
The deduction for entertainment expenses has served as a useful
example of what could have been an alternative to the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act because the Act eliminated the deduction while lowering rates.90 It is
useful in part because it is relatively trivial and uncontroversial, allowing
the focus to be on the merits of revenue-neutral experimentation rather
than the merits of the entertainment deduction itself. Yet revenue-neutral
experimentation also could have been used to assess the impact of
eliminating other deductions. For example, the tax reform reduced the
availability of the business interest deduction.91 A justification for this
reform is that the tax law previously advantaged equity relative to debt
because equity is taxed twice.92 President Obama proposed eliminating
the deduction in part because it increases leverage in the economy as a
whole,93 making it “more susceptible to severe downturns.”94 Others have
argued that it would be better to eliminate the double taxation of equity95
or to allow a deduction based on a corporation’s combined debt and
equity.96 Meanwhile, there is a strong theoretical argument that business
interest should be deductible.97 A tax experiment might have assessed one
or more possible reforms. High demand to participate in such an
experiment would suggest a view that the current approach to business
interest imposes significant distortions. Meanwhile, the government or
90. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat. 2054, 2124–
25 (amending I.R.C. § 274(a) (2012)).
91. See id. § 13301 (amending I.R.C. § 163(j)).
92. See, e.g., Curtis Dubay, Taxation of Debt and Equity: Setting the Record Straight,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/taxation-debt-andequity-setting-the-record-straight [https://perma.cc/W57K-CUCX].
93. WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 9 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P52-DJRF].
94. Id.
95. See Dubay, supra note 92 (arguing that eliminating double taxation should be preferred
to eliminating the deduction).
96. Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1055, 1058 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Charles O. Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest: An Exercise in
Planned Confusion, 41 TAX LAW. 803, 803 (1988) (explaining the logic both for an income tax
base and for a consumption tax base).
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third parties could study how different tax treatment affects decisions
about whether to finance with debt or equity.
Another possible subject for experimentation before enactment would
have been one of the most controversial changes98 in the statute: the
imposition of caps on the deductibility of state and local taxes.99 Many
commentators have claimed that these caps represented a purely political
calculation, as the states most adversely affected by this change were
those with high taxes, and such states are generally “blue states,” which
lean Democratic rather than Republican.100 This highlights that tax policy
has distributional consequences, not just efficiency consequences. Yet
some argue that these deductions may cause states and localities to
oversupply goods that might be more optimally supplied by the market,101
eliminating the tax allows taxpayers to be taxed on the consumption
benefits that they receive.102 There exist counterarguments103 and
compromise proposals.104 A revenue-neutral tax experiment on
individual taxpayers could not allow full examination of these issues,
because such an experiment could not establish how the existence of the
deduction affects state and local policy. But it might highlight whether
taxpayers believe that the deduction distorts their own behavior, for
example by leading them to locate in areas with higher taxes.
b. Allowing New Deductions
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test the
efficiency of new deductions. A tax experiment, for example, could be
used to test the possibility of reintroducing the entertainment expenses
deduction. A taxpayer might believe that the new tax regime is
inefficient, causing the taxpayer to spend too little on entertainment
98. A poll indicated that 75% of voters believed that such taxes should remain deductible.
See Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Oppose GOP Tax-Reform Bill, HILL (Nov. 16, 2017,
12:38 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/360693-poll-majority-oppose-gop-tax-reform-bill
[https://perma.cc/GPD5-5P4P].
99. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085–86
(amending I.R.C. § 164 (2012)).
100. See, e.g., Alicia Parlapiano & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Among the Tax Bill’s Biggest Losers:
High-Income, Blue State Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
12/05/us/politics/tax-bill-salt.html [https://perma.cc/Q3GZ-PC4E] (last updated Dec. 5, 2017).
101. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1996).
102. See Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded
Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 813 (2008).
103. Kaplow, supra note 101, at 486 (noting that the deduction may promote spending on
undersupplied public goods).
104. See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA. TAX
REV. 327, 327 (2016) (arguing for the deductibility of state but not local taxes).
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relative to other ways of recruiting clients. Such a taxpayer should be
willing to opt into an experiment in which the treatment group would
receive the deduction. The taxpayer would then be subject to a multiplier
that would increase nominal tax liability to ensure revenue neutrality.
Thus, the participation carrot and stick are reversed, but the experiment
can be run as before. Similarly, experiments could test reducing the limits
on the business interest deduction and the state and local tax deduction;
such experiments could be executed simultaneously with experiments on
increasing the limits on such deductions.
Meanwhile, experiments could test the possibility of new deductions,
such as a commuting deduction, perhaps limited to the cost of commuting
from a workplace to the nearest location with a supply of affordable
housing.105 More ambitiously, an experiment might test a deduction for
child care, perhaps limited to married taxpayers who both have full time
jobs. The current lack of deductibility may lead parents (particularly
mothers) not to re-enter the work force, even though they would do so in
the absence of tax distortions.106 A married couple might opt into such an
experiment because they anticipate that many in the control group will
not return to the work force. Couples in the treatment group might return
to the work force in greater numbers, paying the same level of taxes as
the control group on average but less than if they returned to the work
force in the absence of the experiment.
2. Income
a. Imputing Income
An alternative policy that might cure the same alleged inefficiency
would be to test imputing income to stay-at-home parents.107 The theory
is that a parent who works at home in effect is paying herself to take a
job, but her income from doing so is not taxed.108 Economists sometimes
argue that imputed income should be taxable,109 but taxing imputed
income seems politically infeasible. Even so, parents might be willing to
opt into an experiment in which time spent on childrearing, perhaps just
during work hours but perhaps more broadly, is taxed. Tax experiments
are not limited to questions of what count as deductions, and taxpayers
105. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed out
Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1350–61 (2017) (proposing to allow deductibility).
107. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618–36 (arguing for
imputing income from household labor).
108. Id. at 1576.
109. See, e.g., Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 115–16, 116 n.45
(2009) (discussing imputed income and citing sources).
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might volunteer to accept a greater tax base (leading to greater taxable
income) in exchange for lower tax rates (because of revenue neutrality).
This experiment might interest similar taxpayers as an experiment on a
child care deduction, but there could be some differences. Taxpayers who
do not expect to be able to itemize deductions, for example, might still be
interested in an imputed income experiment.110 Taxpayers with older
children who can be left alone might prefer this experiment as well.111
An argument against an imputed income experiment is that there is
little reason to conduct an experiment on a tax policy that ultimately will
be politically infeasible. On the other hand, perhaps experimentation
might lead imputing income to become more palatable, particularly in
combination with other policies lowering tax rates for parents. Even if
this experiment is impractical, other imputed income experiments might
be feasible. The second greatest category of tax expenditure as calculated
by the Treasury arises from the lack of imputed income for rent from
owners of housing who live in their homes.112 A tax experiment might
seek to move tax to the “baseline tax system”113 by imputing income for
rent and then allowing “a deduction for expenses, such as interest,
depreciation, property taxes, and other costs, associated with earning such
rental income.”114 Such an experiment might help eliminate distortions
leading to excessive owner-occupied housing.115 In principle, similar
experiments could test other forms of imputed income.116
b. Taxing Work Amenities
Beyond the question of imputed income, experiments on definition of
income can explore fundamental questions about whether the classic

110. Taxpayers who would be below the standard deduction even with child care expenses
would not benefit from deductibility. See I.R.C. § 63(c) (2012 & Supp. 2018) (providing for a
standard deduction).
111. This highlights that tax policies may have externalities. See infra Section II.D. Imputing
income for child care might result in parents leaving their children alone more often, for better or
more likely for worse.
112. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX EXPENDITURES 22 tbl.1 (2017).
113. Id. at 9–10 (arguing that imputed income is taxed in the baseline).
114. Id. at 10.
115. This thus implicates some of the same externality issues as the home mortgage interest
deduction. See infra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
116. There is, however, likely some limit, even if political feasibility is placed to the side.
John Brooks asks, “If I am earning imputed rent from my home, what about from my car? My
furniture? My computer? My dishwasher? My dishes?” John R. Brooks, The Definitions of
Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 253, 255 (2018).
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Haig117-Simons118 model is appropriate or can test small deviations from
the Haig-Simons model. John Brooks critiques Henry Simon’s argument
that “psychic benefits” in income can be ignored because all workers are
equally affected.119 Brooks points out that “[t]here is enough
heterogeneity of psychic benefits across jobs and individuals to make
universal assumptions unreasonable.”120 In theory, a tax authority might
conduct a survey to rate the attractiveness of different jobs and impose a
corresponding tax increase on relatively pleasant and cushy jobs—or,
equivalently given revenue neutrality, a tax decrease for unpleasant jobs.
Taxpayers might be willing to opt into such an experiment if they are
willing to switch to a less pleasant job. A much more modest experiment
aimed at the same theoretical point might seek to tax amenities at work,
ranging from free meals121 to employee gyms.122
c. Changing Recognition Timing
Tax experiments also might apply to issues of timing. Some tax
scholars have advocated switching to a system in which investments
could be marked to market, meaning that taxpayers would recognize
gains and losses each year even if they do not sell the securities.123 A tax
experiment might help evaluate some of the criticisms of a mark-tomarket system, such as that it imposes substantial transactions costs,124
especially if the regime applies beyond publicly held securities to assets

117. Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income–Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) (“Income is the money value of the
net accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time.”).
118. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (defining income as “the result obtained by adding
consumption during the period to ‘wealth’ at the end of the period and then subtracting ‘wealth’
at the beginning”).
119. Brooks, supra note 116, at 264 (“[T]hese elements of unmeasurable psychic income
may be presumed to vary in a somewhat continuous manner along the income scale.”) (quoting
SIMONS, supra note 118, at 53).
120. Id. at 265.
121. Meals are excluded from income if “furnished on the business premises of the
employer” and “for the convenience of the employer.” I.R.C. § 119(a) (2012).
122. “Gross income does not include the value of any on-premises athletic facility provided
by an employer to its employees.” Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e) (1989).
123. Currently mark-to-market is normally available solely for securities dealers like stock
brokerages. I.R.C. § 475. But see I.R.C. § 1256 (West 2018) (providing mark-to-market on
sophisticated financial instruments like future contracts and foreign currency contracts).
124. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and
the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 879–89 (1997) (providing detail on
the issue of transactions costs).
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such as art.125 A significant complication with a tax experiment of this
sort is that the tax experiment must occur over a relatively long time
horizon. This Article will return to this issue, along to the related danger
that participants in tax experiments may seek to shift income into or out
of the experimental period, below.126
3. Tax Procedure
Revenue-neutral tax experiments can also be used to test procedural
changes. For example, an experiment might test a regime in which the
government would agree to provide binding opinions on tax questions by
phone or email. Because taxpayers might then take advantage of mistaken
statements of tax law by tax authority employees,127 the treatment group
would likely pay lower taxes than the control group, leading to an ex post
multiplier increasing tax rates. Ideally, the ex post adjustment should also
compensate for the extra expenses borne by the tax authority in providing
extra customer service to the treatment taxpayers.
Experiments could also test taxpayer-adverse procedural changes. For
example, some taxpayers with relatively complex returns (say, taxpayers
with foreign bank accounts) might opt into a regime in which those
taxpayers agree to submit with their tax returns a report submitted by a
privately selected auditor. Such taxpayers presumably would be less
likely to engage in tax evasion. But in expectation, they would pay no
higher taxes than before, since the multiplier would be less than one. Such
an experiment could provide valuable information to the tax authority. If
the control group taxpayers reported much less in nominal taxes before
application of the multiplier, that would indicate a high degree of tax
avoidance and a high degree of effectiveness of a private audit
requirement. If, on the other hand, differences were small, incorporating
the program into the baseline tax regime would generate little revenue.
4. Radical Tax Reform
Revenue-neutral tax experimentation can be used not only to assess
relatively minor changes in deductions, but also significant differences in
policy. For example, scholars have proposed abolishing the corporate
tax—which historically took an average of 27% of each company’s
125. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A
“Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 801–02 (1992) (discussing
applicable rules for art objects).
126. See infra Section II.C.2 (addressing income and deduction shifting).
127. Currently, when a taxpayer calling the IRS gets an answer from an IRS employee, the
taxpayer has no legal entitlement to rely on that answer. Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on
IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421, 431–37 (2015).
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profits128—and instead granting the government a roughly equivalent
claim on the corporation’s equity. Thus, the government might receive
27% of a corporation’s stock.129 This reform promises significant
efficiency gains, as tax-minimization goals would no longer distort
decisions, and because corporations would no longer need legions of
well-paid tax advisors.130
It might seem that this is not amenable to a revenue-neutral tax
experiment. If the government receives equity, there is no way to ensure
that the equity that the corporation contributes will produce equal revenue
over time. But a change in the experimental design could enable the
reform proposal to be tested. The government could auction rights to
some percentage of the tax revenue that it will receive from both the
treatment group and the control group. The government might then adjust
the ownership percentage that the government takes until both revenue
streams sell to the market for the same price. For example, the
government might initially offer 27%, but then increase this if it was
unable to find a sufficient number of purchasers of the revenue stream at
that price. As the government changes the ownership percentage, some
corporate taxpayers might change their mind about whether to participate
in the experiment. But ultimately, the government should be able to
identify an ownership percentage that is revenue neutral in expectation.
That does not mean that every radical tax reform is amenable to tax
experimentation. It seems unlikely, for example, that a value added tax
could be implemented on an experimental basis.131 A value-added tax
requires each producer to pay tax on the value it adds; so, for example, a
producer purchasing a product for $100 and selling it for $150 would pay
tax only on the $50 difference.132 If enacted economy-wide, then a
combination of taxpayers in the value chain pay tax on all of the $150. If
128. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX
RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2014).
129. See Dean Baker, Opinion, A Progressive Way to End Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/a-progressive-way-to-replacecorporate-taxes.html (providing additional details of this proposal, including that the shares
should be nontransferrable); cf. Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592
(2007) (“The state, thanks to its tax claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority
shareholder in almost all corporations.”).
130. Baker, supra note 129.
131. Consumption taxes that are administered in much the same way as income taxes, rather
than like sales taxes, could be a subject of experimentation. See generally David F. Bradford, The
X-Tax in the World Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10676, 2004),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w10676.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LWF-MN2V] (describing such an
approach to taxation).
132. For a discussion of different ways of calculating the tax, see generally Itai Grinberg,
Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for a Partial Replacement VAT,
63 TAX L. REV. 309 (2010).
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only some producers were required to pay tax, the system could become
much more complex. Value-added taxes already create challenges of
international harmonization,133 but this would magnify those challenges
on a domestic level.
II. CHALLENGES FOR TAX EXPERIMENTATION
This Part addresses challenges for tax experimentation, specifically
questions of how to transition and scale up successful experiments,
whether tax experiments will adversely affect tax equity, whether
taxpayers might be able to manipulate tax experimentation to their
advantage, and whether tax experiments can work with tax expenditures
without adversely affecting other tax policy goals.
A. Transitions
This Section discusses how the government can determine whether
to scale up an experiment or transition to a later stage of experimentation,
such as an opt-out or involuntary experiment, prior to enactment as
general law.
1. Increased Scope
The goal of tax experimentation is to provide information that can
change baseline tax policy. Although appropriate experimental design
can improve policymakers’ ability to judge whether an experiment is a
success,134 the most easily accessible benchmark of success is simply
participation. Given the constraint of revenue neutrality, taxpayer
demand to be in the experiment suggests that the tax change is Paretoimproving, at least so long as the tax change does not induce behaviors
that have effects on third parties.135 But that leaves unclear whether the
experiment would benefit others. Perhaps other taxpayers who might
benefit from the experiment have not signed up simply because they did
not know about it. But they may have chosen not to enroll because they
expect that they would do less well under the experimental conditions.
Thus, a first step in transitioning from experiment to a tax law change
is to invite more taxpayers to receive the treatment. If in initial rounds
only some taxpayers were invited to participate in the experiment, then
more might be allowed to participate, still assigning the same proportion
of enrollees to treatment and control as before. With two-level
randomization,136 for example, a higher proportion of eligible taxpayers
133. See, e.g., id. at 321–22 (discussing some international issues).
134. See supra Section I.A.4 (addressing enhancement of experimental interpretability and
appropriate experimental design).
135. The possibility of externalities is addressed infra Section II.D.
136. See supra Section I.A.4.b (addressing two-level randomization).
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might be invited to participate. Alternatively or as a supplement, a higher
percentage of opt-ins might be selected for the treatment group. Indeed,
if an experiment continues to be successful, it is possible that all
taxpayers who wish to opt-in might ultimately be assigned to the
treatment group.
At this point, the experiment ceases to be an experiment. Rather, some
may see it as tax reform in and of itself, though of a different form from
what one might expect. The tax reform amounts to giving taxpayers the
option to elect a particular tax regime in the subsequent year, in
combination with a tax rate change.137 Tax law already allows taxpayers
to elect various options.138 If the change is still to aim at revenue
neutrality, then, as in the experiment itself, different taxpayers should
receive different rate reductions based on data from past tax returns.
Without a control group, it will be impossible to do this precisely, though
the government might approximate this by using data from when a
control group still existed. Making the treatment generally available will
not likely reduce government revenues, as those who did not opt into the
experiment in the past will tend to be those who benefit less from the
experimental treatment.
There may, however, be a strong reason not to allow all taxpayers into
the treatment group, even if all taxpayers (or at least all taxpayers who
know about the program and might plausibly be affected by it) would
choose to opt in. Once an alternative tax regime has expanded to be
available as an option to all taxpayers meeting specified criteria, then it
becomes impossible to run an experiment confirming that the alternative
regime continues to produce at least as much tax revenue as the generally
applicable tax law. The same problem applies with medical trials: once a
drug is generally available, there must be “clinical equipoise” if the drug
is to be tested against placebo.139 Thus, the case for maintaining a control
group is similar to the case for revenue-neutral tax experimentation
generally. Even if only a few taxpayers wind up in the control group, this
allows for continued study of the tax rule, which may be especially
important if the efficiency of the rule changes over time. This is
especially true with revenue-neutral experimentation, since the control
group serves a critical role in allowing the tax rate to vary across
treatment group taxpayers.

137. I.R.C. § 451(c)(2)(B) (West 2018).
138. See, e.g., id. § 451(c)(2) (allowing taxpayers to elect a particular approach to advance
payments).
139. See Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials
Unethical?, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 3 (2002); see also Alex John London et al., Rethinking Research
Ethics: The Case of Postmarketing Trials, 336 SCIENCE 544 (2012) (discussing ethical issues in
postapproval studies).
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2. Opt-Out Experiments
A voluntary tax experiment can either be opt-in, where a taxpayer who
takes no action remains subject to generally applicable tax law, or optout, where a taxpayer will be subject to the alternative tax regime without
affirmatively taking a step to elect generally applicable law. So far, we
have assumed that all tax experiments would be opt-in. This approach fits
better into the landscape of typical randomized governmental
experiments.140 Such experimentation is generally rare, but when the
government has engaged in it, usually there is some benefit (e.g., a
welfare program,141 a child’s eligibility for a school voucher program142)
that the government makes available to volunteers (i.e., those who opt
in). Randomization thus has the dual benefit of allocating a scarce
resource and providing the government with better information.
Moreover, such experiments help ensure that experimentation is Paretooptimal, since properly informed taxpayers will opt into an alternative tax
regime only if they expect it to increase their utility.
In an opt-in experiment, the government should provide a meaningful
disclosure to invited taxpayers. At least, such a disclosure should explain
that assignment to the treatment group will change the taxpayer’s baseline
tax liability, but that later adjustments will ensure that treatment
taxpayers on average pay on average the same amount of taxes as those
in the control group. The disclosure should also indicate how long the
taxpayer will be subject to the treatment regime. We have assumed that
experiments would be for one year only, but taxpayers could be placed
into a treatment group for longer, particularly if the relevant tax
provisions affect behavior with long-lasting tax consequences, such as
purchasing depreciable assets.143
Such disclosures could also be used in opt-out experiments, and
indeed may be more important given that participation is the default. A
transition from an opt-in to an opt-out experiment allows for an
intermediate step, less drastic than permanent experimental adoption.
Behavioral economics teaches that there may be large differences in
140. See generally Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 1 (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael
Timpane eds., 1975) (discussing a wide range of experiments).
141. See, e.g., KERSHAW & FAIR, supra note 16, at 4.
142. See generally, e.g., Paul E. Peterson et al., School Vouchers: Results from Randomized
Experiments, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 107 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2003)
(discussing school voucher programs).
143. See I.R.C. § 167 (2012) (allowing depreciation deductions for assets held for business
or investment purposes); see also I.R.C. § 168 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (providing method for
calculating depreciation deductions for tangible property, typically over multiple years, even
decades).
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responses depending on whether an experiment is opt-in or opt-out.144
Thus, a change in an experiment from opt-in to opt-out is a plausible
strategy for expanding the scope of an experiment, including far larger
numbers of taxpayers and reducing the risk that any beneficial
experimental outcomes are due to selection effects. The principal
drawback is that opt-out creates the risk that many taxpayers who would
not wish to participate will be enrolled because of inertia or because they
ignored any information that they received about the experiment. Opt-out
thus does less to ensure that the alternative tax regime increases expected
taxpayer utility.
Nonetheless, an opt-out experiment remains less coercive than an
actual change in the law. If the tax change being experimented with is a
plausible candidate for ultimate adoption into the tax code, then an optout experiment is a modest step. Moreover, revenue neutrality may make
opt-out experimentation less problematic than it would be with some
other experiments. Revenue neutrality does not mean that a taxpayer
should be indifferent as to which group the taxpayer is assigned; after all,
a primary justification for revenue-neutral experimentation is that even
revenue-neutral tax changes can benefit taxpayers. But revenue neutrality
is a significant constraint on tax experiments. Members of the treatment
group will be harmed only if the tax experiment in fact turns out to
provide less efficient incentives to those in the group. The tax authority
presumably will choose experiments that it believes have a substantial
chance of producing some benefit, so taxpayers who fail to consider the
merits of the experiment will likely not be harmed by being in the
treatment group.
3. Involuntary Experimentation
Revenue neutrality also makes an involuntary tax experiment more
plausible than involuntary social experiments ordinarily would be. At the
least, involuntary experimentation is a useful step after an opt-out
experiment before a tax law change is adopted for all taxpayers. If the
experiment is to continue at this stage, presumably the tax authority has
concluded at least tentatively that the tax change is beneficial. Thus, it
seems likely that those placed in the treatment group benefit relative to
those in the control group. The virtue of an involuntary experiment is that
it eliminates concerns about selection effects, virtually ensuring that any

144. See William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy, 62 NAT’L TAX J.
375, 375–76 (2009) (noting the distinction in result between requiring opt-out to offering opt-in).
See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) (discussing the status quo bias); William
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (same).
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difference discerned between the treatment and control groups would
apply if the tax law change were made universal.
Some taxpayers who might not opt into an opt-in experiment or who
might opt out of an opt-out experiment nonetheless might be happy to be
included in an involuntary experiment. This would not be true with most
social experiments but is a result of revenue neutrality. A taxpayer might
believe that a revenue-neutral elimination of the entertainment deduction
would be efficient as applied to its activities, but the taxpayer still might
worry that the other taxpayers willing to participate in a voluntary
experiment are those who expect their entertainment expenses to fall for
largely exogenous reasons. This adverse selection is no longer a concern
with involuntary experimentation.
The argument for involuntary experimentation is thus akin to an
argument for mandatory purchases of insurance. Coverage requirements
exist in part for this reason in the automobile insurance market, 145 and
individuals are required to obtain health insurance under the Affordable
Care Act for this reason.146 In the health insurance context, the worry is
that relatively healthy good risks will decide not to buy health insurance,
making the market less attractive for slightly-less-good risks and
potentially leading to a “death spiral” in which no one buys insurance,147
even though many would like insurance at actuarially fair rates. In this
context, a death spiral would be an experiment in which no one
participates, even though many would participate absent adverse
selection. In principle, this prospect can provide a normative case for
involuntary experimentation even as the first step of an experiment,
though that might be politically untenable.
In the insurance context, however, a coverage requirement is
equitable; all drivers must purchase coverage, not half of all drivers
chosen at random. Whether experiments are opt-in, opt-out, or
mandatory, the prospect of horizontal inequity is likely to be the most
significant obstacle to tax experimentation. This Article thus turns to that
concern.

145. See Mila Araujo, Understanding Minimum Car Insurance Requirements, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/understanding-minimum-car-insurance-requirements-2645473
[https://perma.cc/5T8S-TJ3T] (last updated Nov. 1, 2018) (noting that forty-seven states require
automobile insurance).
146. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act eliminated the tax for noncompliance by setting the penalty
to $0. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97 § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092
(amending I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)).
147. For an argument that the risk is exaggerated, see Peter Siegelman, Essay, Adverse
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1254–58 (2004).
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B. Equity
This section addresses equity objections to tax experimentation,
considering both horizontal equity and after-tax income inequality.
1. Horizontal Equity
a. The Case for Randomness
Horizontal equity is an often-cited tax policy, the gist of which is that
people with the same income should pay the same amount of tax.148 The
concern that tax experimentation might violate horizontal equity reflects
the more general argument that randomization of government policy is
inherently unequal.149 If the government randomizes taxpayers who have
opted into an alternative tax regime into a control group, subject to the
generally applicable law, then the control-group taxpayers are arguably
being treated inequitably. Similarly, with two-level randomization,
taxpayers who are eligible for an alternative tax regime, but who are not
invited to opt in, are arguably being treated inequitably compared to those
invited.150
The general consensus in the literature has been that experimentation
is acceptable if there is a sufficient justification for the difference in
treatment.151 Involuntary experimentation is most common in contexts in
which individuals are thought to have lost their rights as a result of
committing crimes.152 In one notable criminal justice experiment,
domestic violence perpetrators in the Bronx were randomly assigned to
one of four different treatment programs.153 That experiment concluded
148. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES,
3.1.4 (Thomson Reuters 2d/3d ed. 1993 & Supp. II 2018); see also Alan J. Auerbach
& Kevin A. Hassett, A New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002)
(“There is virtual unanimity that horizontal equality, treating equals equally, is a worthy goal of
any tax system.”).
149. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 967. For the counterargument, see Adam M.
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2009) (arguing that
randomization can be consistent with equality).
150. See supra Section I.A.4.b.
151. See, e.g., Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 967–68; Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact
of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 16
(1988).
152. See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, Research Note, The Baltimore City
Drug Treatment Court: One-Year Results from a Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
337, 343 (2002) (assigning offenders either to a drug court or to standard criminal process).
153. MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF BATTERER PROGRAMS AND JUDICIAL MONITORING: RESULTS FROM A RANDOMIZED TRIAL AT
THE BRONX MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT v (2005), http://www.courtinnovation.
org/sites/default/files/battererprogramseffectiveness.pdf [https://perma.cc/985N-Q6WA].
AND GIFTS ¶
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that treatment programs commonly employed throughout the nation for
batterers may not be effective.154 An experiment giving individuals who
had not been convicted of domestic violence incentives to enroll in
various programs might well seem inequitable.
The most common justification for randomization in government
experiments is scarcity.155 For example, experiments on supplements to
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)156 have given the benefits to only
some eager to participate.157 Because the government expects to lose
money on each member of the treatment group, revenue constraints limit
the number of people included. Revenue neutrality might seem to weaken
the scarcity justification for a tax experiment, as neither group costs the
government more than the other. For revenue neutrality to work,
however, there must be a control group, so that multipliers can be
calculated. Membership in the treatment group is thus inherently scarce.
A scarcity argument is much more difficult to make in the context of
involuntary experimentation. With a mandatory experiment, taxpayers
forced into the treatment group who may be treated inequitably. But this
is just a question of baselines. One could frame the treatment group as
embodying new legal policy, subject to confirmation of the experiment’s
success. Then, membership in the control group is scarce, and so
treatment group members are not being treated inequitably. The groups
are being treated differently, but only because membership in each group
must be scarce for an experiment to proceed.
These arguments for scarcity may seem artificial because the desired
form of taxation, whether it is the treatment or the control, could at least
in principle be given to all taxpayers, just not in the form of an
experiment. But that is true with all social experimentation. Indeed, even
with medical experimentation, scarcity is artificial. Presumably, all
patients prefer the treatment, but we insist that they take some risk of
154. Id. at ix (“Regrettably, our study suggests that some of the most prevalent court
responses to domestic violence crime may be ineffective . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC
POLICYMAKING 225 (2003) (“Random assignment usually became more acceptable [when
officials] recognized that they did not have sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and,
hence, that some mechanism was needed to determine who would be denied services.”).
156. I.R.C. § 32 (2012 & Supp. V 2018). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 148,
¶ 37.1 (discussing the EITC in detail).
157. An experiment called “Paycheck Plus” on supplementing the EITC for single workers
without children, for whom the EITC is very limited, has been ongoing in New York City and
Atlanta, Georgia. See Rachel Pardoe & Dan Bloom, Paycheck Plus: A New Antipoverty Strategy
for Single Adults, MDRC POL’Y BRIEF (MDRC, New York, N.Y.), May 2014, at 1,
http://www.mdrc.org/publication/paycheck-plus/file-full [https://perma.cc/LU73-XNHP]. This
program involves both treatment groups (receiving the extra EITC) and control groups (who do
not). Id. at 4.
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being placed in the control group because we are not sure that the
treatment is better than placebo.158 The baseline in which the patients do
not have access to the treatment is purely a result of law, both in the
medical context and in the tax context.
The ultimate justification for experimentation in both contexts is
informational.159 As with medical experiments, the justifiability of a
social experiment depends on an evaluation of whether the treatment has
a significant chance of being beneficial and whether the experiment may
succeed in producing useful information.160 One might argue that tax
experimentation is more troubling than other legal experiments because
horizontal equity is an important tax-law goal.161 On this argument, it
might be acceptable to have random experiments concerning patent
policy,162 where the primary goal is to maximize economic efficiency,163
but less acceptable to allow inequalities to creep into tax policy. Some
tax scholars, however, have criticized horizontal equity as a meaningless
concept.164 Indeed, economist Richard Musgrave argued that the only
purpose of horizontal equity was as a “safeguard against capricious
discrimination—a safeguard which might be provided equally well by a
requirement that taxes be distributed at random.”165
Tax law has long used randomization.166 For example, the IRS uses
randomization in selecting which taxpayers’ returns to audit.167
158. See Miller & Brody, supra note 26, at 157.
159. Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 965 (“[R]andom policy experimentation . . . will
produce better information than nonrandomized experiments.” (emphasis omitted)).
160. Macartan Humphreys, Reflections on the Ethics of Social Experimentation, 6 J.
GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 87, 87–88 (2015).
161. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 13, at 96–97.
163. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58, 377 (2010)
(describing the “reward” of exclusive patent rights as a “dominant justificatory theor[y] of patent
law” that “largely motivates current patent doctrine”).
164. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Commentary, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 621 (1993) (arguing that
horizontal equity lacks “independent normative content, and that content must be supplied by
reference to economic assumptions and a theory of justice”); accord James Repetti & Diane Ring,
Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 135 (2012).
165. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959) (emphasis added).
166. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 161, 163 (2008) (“[T]he tax system currently employs explicit randomness . . . .”).
167. The IRS has three basic methods for selecting taxpayers to audit, two of which involve
randomization. See id. at 164–68 (discussing these three categories). First, some taxpayers’
returns have features that virtually always merit audit, such as clearly missing income. See IRM
4.1.5.1.3.4 (Oct. 20, 2017). Such audits are not random. Second, the IRS has a highly confidential
statistical methodology called the Discriminant Index Function (DIF) that scores the likelihood of
an audit that increases tax revenue; the higher the DIF score, the greater the probability of being
audited. IRM 4.1.2.7 (Oct. 19, 2017). Third, pursuant to the IRS’s National Research Program
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Experimentation involving randomization would likely survive
constitutional scrutiny. Tax classifications are subjected to rational basis
review, meaning they will be upheld if “rationally related” to a
“legitimate” government interest.168 Increasing taxpayer utility while
maintaining at least the same tax revenue is a legitimate government
interest,169 and randomization allows the government to pursue these
interests. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the
government has particularly broad constitutional latitude with tax law.170
b. Ex Ante Insurance to Avoid Inequity
If the horizontal inequity of tax experimentation is still thought to
present a powerful objection, the government might seek to reduce the
inequity. Allowing treatment group taxpayers to choose to be in the
control group or vice-versa would defeat the purpose of the experiment.
But the government could seek to make it so that taxpayers will ex ante
be indifferent to which group the taxpayer is assigned.
The government might do this by offering taxpayers randomization
insurance. Suppose, for example, that equal numbers of participants
(whether opt-ins, non-opt-outs, or conscripts) are to be assigned to
treatment and control. The government could allow any taxpayer to pay
$1,000 to purchase a unit of insurance that would pay $2,000 if the
taxpayer is assigned to the group that the taxpayer prefers less. For
example, a taxpayer who would like the treatment might purchase for
$10,000 insurance that would pay $20,000 if the taxpayer ended up
assigned to the control group. A risk-averse taxpayer should purchase
enough insurance on the initially less-favored option to make the taxpayer
indifferent between the options.171
(NRP), some taxpayers are selected entirely at random. IRM 4.22.1.3(4) (Sept. 6, 2017) (“As
randomly selected returns, NRP taxpayers can represent thousands of similar taxpayers in the
population.”).
168. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Apache
Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on standing
grounds en banc, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566
U.S. 673, 680 (2012) (“As long as the City’s [tax] distinction has a rational basis, that distinction
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (applying the rational basis test).
169. Colangelo v. United States, 575 F.2d 994, 998 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting)
(maintaining tax collections is a legitimate government interest).
170. Armour, 566 U.S. at 680 (“[W]e have repeatedly pointed out that ‘[l]egislatures have
especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 547)).
171. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 601 (1984) (“If an individual is averse to risk and actuarially fair
insurance can be purchased (from a risk-neutral third party insurer), then it is not difficult to show
that the individual will completely insure against the risk.”).
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Because assignment to a group is a product of pure chance, there is no
danger of adverse selection with such insurance. An insurance payout is
a lump sum, rather than an entitlement to be taxed according to the other
tax regime, so there is also little danger that the insurance program will
change the insureds’ behavior. Meanwhile, the program could be
inexpensive to administer, with insurance payments and payouts
calculated on tax returns. For the government, which is effectively risk
neutral, to offer actuarially fair insurance has no expected budget impact.
Private parties could also offer such insurance, but the product is so
simple and so connected to the government program of experimentation
that it is likely easier for the government to offer the product directly.
Actuarially fair government insurance should be more popular than
insurance in which much of the insurance premium covers insurance
company functions like rating and underwriting.
2. After-Tax Income Inequality
The above analysis suggests that the intuition that tax experimentation
entails serious horizontal inequities is weak. Nonetheless, one might
worry about vertical inequities. Tax experimentation’s benefits may
primarily flow to higher income taxpayers, worsening after-tax income
inequality, if tax experimentation is opt-in.172 This may happen for
several reasons. First, higher income taxpayers have better tax advisors
or are more tax savvy (or both). They will thus be more likely to opt into
alternative tax regimes that they expect to benefit them. Second, higher
income taxpayers may be subject to more complicated tax rules,173 thus
creating more opportunities for alternative tax regimes that benefit them.
Third, wealthier taxpayers tend to be less risk-averse.174 Even if the
172. This concern about worsening inequality is related to but not the same as “vertical
equity.” Vertical equity is the idea that there should be an “appropriate” pattern of differentiation
between those of different levels of economic income. McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 164, at
607; see also Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX
J. 139, 140–41 (1989) (explaining the idea of vertical equity). “The vertical equity principle,”
however, “does not prescribe whether tax rates should be proportional, progressive, or regressive;
nor, if progression or regression is the chosen mode, does it indicate how steep the slope should
be.” BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 148; accord McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 164, at 610
(“The word ‘appropriate’ is not self-defining . . . .”); id. (“VE [vertical equity] could apply to a
tax system that is progressive, proportional or regressive.”).
173. The simplest tax return, the 1040EZ, can only be used by taxpayers with taxable income
below $100,000. See Topic Number 352 - Which Form – 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ?, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc352 [https://perma.cc/3AMM-HY6N] (last updated Feb. 12,
2018). The most complicated return, the 1040, includes numerous schedules for more complex
tax situations. Id.
174. See KENNETH J. ARROW, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RISK-BEARING 90, 92–93 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 55 n.31 (2d ed. 1989).
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alternative regime appears ex ante to offer a better expected outcome for
the taxpayer, it may turn out to be worse if circumstances change. This
danger is more likely to scare off lower-income taxpayers.
Arguably, one should see even a policy that dominantly benefits
wealthy taxpayers as enhancing social welfare if other taxpayers are not
harmed. Placing aside externalities,175 revenue-neutral tax
experimentation, unlike virtually all other conceivable tax reform,176 is
Pareto optimal,177 and many often think Pareto improvements to be
welfare-improving,178 despite experimental evidence that people
sometimes are willing to accept Pareto-dominated outcomes.179 The
argument against tax law benefits for the wealthy that do not reduce
resources to others requires a modification of the Pareto criterion so that
each person’s welfare depends on relative wealth.180 Revenue-neutral tax
experiments from which wealthy taxpayers benefit may still be Paretoimproving, however. In the example of the entertainment deduction, it
seems unlikely that the utility of non-wealthy taxpayers falls because
wealthy taxpayers reallocate spending from the entertainment category.
Indeed, such a change plausibly might reduce the perception of
inequality, as opting-in taxpayers have lower after tax income. Thus, if
one measures inequality solely through a measure like the Gini
coefficient,181 inequality is reduced.182 In this case, experimentation
might produce greater inequality of happiness, but not greater financial
inequality.
175. See infra Section II.D.
176. See, e.g., Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean
Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8, 42–43 (2001) (noting that
“any type of radical tax change” is likely to violate the Pareto criterion, at least in the short term).
177. A pareto improvement is one that makes some better off and no one worse off. See JOHN
BLACK ET AL., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 301 (4th ed. 2012).
178. For a defense of using the Pareto principle in policy analysis, see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1015 (2001).
179. See, e.g., Dorothea K. Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, Inequality Aversion and Efficiency
with Ordinal and Cardinal Social Preferences—an Experimental Study, 76 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 238, 252 (2010).
180. See Sven Ove Hansson, Welfare, Justice, and Pareto Efficiency, 7 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 361, 377–79 (2004) (suggesting such an adjustment); see also Khandakar QudratI Elahi, Economic Inequality and Paretian Welfare Economics: Some Insinuating Questions, 35
F. SOC. ECON. 19, 28–32 (2005) (critiquing the Pareto criterion given concerns about inequality).
181. See generally Corrado Gini, Concentration and Dependency Ratios, 87 RIVISTA DI
POLITICA ECONOMICA 769 (1997) (providing English translation of Gini’s 1909 article in Italian).
182. The Gini coefficient is generally reported as a function of household income. See, e.g.,
JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2016, at 8 (2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/
P60-259.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4LW-QACL]. Household income would not include deductible
business expenses.
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Suppose, however, that tax experimentation might increase inequality
under some definition to sufficiently outweigh any efficiency benefits. At
least in principle, any benefit accruing to high-income taxpayers could be
reallocated in part to low-income taxpayers. That is, if high-income
taxpayers expect to receive a utility benefit equal to $1,000 from some
sort of tax experimentation, then the law creating such experimentation
could impose a new tax on higher income taxpayers and redistribute the
receipts to lower income taxpayers. This argument is frequently made on
behalf of programs that increase economic efficiency but may have
negative redistributive consequences,183 and it leads to the retort that the
mere possibility of redistribution does not justify a policy if the law
creating the efficient policy does not affect redistribution.184 In principle,
however, a hypothetical statute that authorized tax experimentation in
conjunction with other progressive tax changes could answer the
distribution objection.
C. Manipulation
Taxpayers may attempt to exploit the availability of tax
experiments185 in several ways. First, taxpayers who know about an
experiment may change their behavior to become eligible for invitation
into the alternative regime. Relatedly, taxpayers may change their
behavior or their reporting so that they are matched to taxpayers in the
control group likely to pay low taxes. Second, taxpayers subject to an
alternative tax regime may minimize their taxes by shifting gross income
and deductions between the tax years subject to the alternative regime
and tax years not subject to the alternative regime. Third, taxpayers may
change their tax status. This Article will consider each of these in turn.
1. Eligibility and Matching
Some taxpayers always attempt to game the tax laws to their
advantage, and the same will doubtless be true of eligibility for tax
experiments. Tax experiments might be limited to particular taxpayers,
such as members of a particular industry. For example, the government
183. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 821, 822 (2000).
184. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1082–83 (2016) (arguing that just as transactions costs can
prevent achievement of efficiency goals, so too can political action costs prevent achievement of
distributive goals).
185. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 869 (1999)
(“Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover
how to take advantage of them.”).
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might consider limiting eligibility for an experiment on eliminating
deductibility of travel expenses to an industry in which such expenses
generally seem unnecessary, such as health professionals who currently
can deduct trips to conferences at fancy vacation destinations.186 This is,
however, an incomplete solution. A taxpayer who does not expect to need
to take significant travel deductions anyway might seek to classify as a
health professional, even if the taxpayer’s business is only marginally
related to health.
A taxpayer might have similar manipulation incentives even in an
experiment for which the taxpayer is clearly eligible or for which there
are no eligibility limitations. Recall that after a treatment group taxpayer
calculates tax liability under the new rules, this amount is multiplied by
a number chosen to ensure revenue neutrality. That multiplier is based on
the quotient of the tax liability one would expect the taxpayer to have
based on the taxpayer’s past data if assigned to the control group, divided
by the nominal tax liability expected if assigned to the treatment group.187
If the government uses a multivariate regression, the taxpayer hopes to
have characteristics that lead to a prediction that the taxpayer will have
much higher nominal liability in the treatment group. A taxpayer
planning ahead may be able to generate data in a year before the
experiment that will lead to such predictions.
The taxpayer’s manipulation incentives will be the opposite in a tax
experiment assessing the efficiency of a new deduction. Then, the
taxpayer would like to be matched to other participants whose behavior
will change the least. For example, if the experiment considers the
possibility of a new deduction for certain commuting expenses, then the
taxpayer would like to be matched with taxpayers who are likely to
receive only a small benefit from the availability of the commuting
deduction. A taxpayer who can claim a large amount for an experimental
new deduction will be able to keep most of this benefit, if the regression
predicts that the taxpayer’s nominal taxable income would be similar
whether the taxpayer is in the control or treatment group. In an extreme
case, a taxpayer might move very close to work in the year before the
experiment and then move much further away in the experimental year.
The tax authority might take several steps to limit the success of such
manipulation. First, the government might define the relevant tax
provision narrowly to reduce such gaming. The travel experiment might
affect only deductions for travel to health-related conferences, and the
commuting deduction might be eligible only for taxpayers who live a
certain distance from work. Second, the government can keep
186. Cf. DR.’S REV., http://www.doctorsreview.com [https://perma.cc/X62R-ACQB]
(allowing search for medical conferences based on desired destination).
187. See supra Section I.A.2.
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manipulable eligibility criteria and the variables used to match taxpayers
confidential. The IRS already does something similar, keeping
confidential the criteria that affect the probability that the IRS will audit
a taxpayer.188 On the other hand, there may be value in publishing such
data to allow the public to better inform itself about whether an
experiment was successful. Third, the government can use older data that
predate the announcement of the experiment (not just data that predate
the experimental year) to filter out opportunistic taxpayers. Fourth, the
government might collect and then heavily weight data not easily
manipulated by taxpayers, such as the college or graduate degrees
received by the taxpayer, or the industry of past employers.
Ultimately, some manipulation is still likely to occur on the margins.
The problem, however, should not be overstated. Tax law already
presents many opportunities for fraud, and criminal and civil liability may
deter many taxpayers from fraudulently filling out their tax returns in the
hope of receiving a deduction.189 If, nonetheless, many taxpayers seek to
define themselves in a way that they anticipate will lead to better
treatment, the strategy will be self-defeating. For example, if many nonhealth professionals classified themselves as health professionals, then
the non-health professionals would be matched with many other nonhealth professionals. The problem is then reduced to the danger that real
health professionals would not want to participate in the experiment for
fear of being matched with non-health professionals. But the experiment
failing for this reason would simply indicate that the underlying
hypothetical tax provision (elimination of a deduction but only for health
professionals) is unworkable because the eligibility criteria are easily
manipulated. This itself is a valuable lesson for a tax experiment.
2. Income and Deduction Shifting
Taxpayers who are subject to an alternative tax treatment may try to
minimize their taxes by shifting income and deductions from years in
which they are subject to the treatment to years when the generally
applicable tax rules apply to them. Or, taxpayers may try to shift gross
income and deductions in the opposite direction, to years covered by the
alternative tax regime. For example, if the alternative tax regime were a
lower marginal rate of taxation in exchange for losing a deduction, a
taxpayer may shift as much income as possible into years covered by the
alternative regime. The taxpayer might do this by negotiating with their
employer to forgo a bonus in a year subject to generally applicable tax
188. IRM 4.1.2.7 (Oct. 19, 2017) (“DIF mathematical formulas are confidential and for
official use only. The DIF score assigned to a return should not be disclosed.”).
189. If the federal government has insufficient resources to prosecute tax fraud, qui tam suits
could enable greater enforcement. See Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from
the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1922 (2013).
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law with the understanding that the taxpayer would receive a larger bonus
the next year, when the alternative regime would apply. Meanwhile, in
the opposite type of experiment, where the taxpayer expects to pay a
higher tax rate, the taxpayer could seek to shift income to a later year.
Experiments can address these problems. The alternative tax regime
could apply for multiple years to minimize the potential for short-term
mischief. Taxpayers might be informed of their group assignment on
January 1 to prevent any manipulation in advance of the experiment. For
each year of the experiment, a separate model of the behavior of control
group and treatment group taxpayers would be developed so the
multiplier a taxpayer receives would vary from year to year. The
government would assess the experiment on a year-to-year basis, and it
might focus analysis especially on taxpayers entering the first year of the
experiment, since income shifting is likely to be most plausible near the
end of an experiment. In principle, the government could even design an
experiment to be permanent. A taxpayer giving up a deduction would be
giving that deduction up permanently, and each year would receive some
discount in exchange. If the tax law changed so that no taxpayers received
this deduction anymore, then the multiplier would end up being closer to
one.
A less drastic approach is for the separate tax treatment to apply only
during the experimental period (perhaps even just a year), but for a
multiplier to be calculated for each taxpayer for each subsequent year.
This addresses the concern that even if an experiment is revenue-neutral
during the period of the experiment, it might not be revenue-neutral
afterward. So long as the multiplier approach is used in all subsequent
years,190 the experiment is guaranteed to be revenue neutral over
taxpayers’ entire lives. Thus, if treatment taxpayers were shifting income
into the years of the experiment, they would receive large discounts
during this time, but they might report less nominal tax liability after the
experiment ends and therefore have to pay higher tax rates then.
The length of the experiment aside, tax law includes tools to
discourage gaming. Auditors should rigorously apply the existing tax-law
doctrines that prevent shifting gross income and deductions between
years, such as the constructive receipt doctrine191 and the economic

190. Eventually, too few taxpayers might remain living to enable meaningful comparison of
the treatment and control groups. At this point, it would likely be appropriate to use data from
previous years.
191. This doctrine prevents cash method taxpayers (which are the vast majority of individual
taxpayers) from postponing the reporting of gross income by failing to exercise the power to
collect it. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 148, ¶ 5.9.
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performance doctrine.192 Meanwhile, the government might prioritize
experimenting with alternative tax regimes that limit the scope of incomeshifting. Capital gains, for example, might be particularly easy to shift,193
and so the government might prioritize tax experiments that apply to only
ordinary income (that is, income that is not capital gains).194
3. Status Changes
Individuals can get married or divorced; corporations can merge with
others or divide into multiple corporations (for example, by spinning off
a business into a new corporation). If a taxpayer is subject to an
alternative tax regime, how would such status changes apply? The rules
governing such status changes must be designed with care to prevent
opportunistic, inefficient behavior. For example, suppose that company
T is a treatment group taxpayer subject to an alternative tax regime, while
company A is not. Suppose A is in a position so that the alternative regime
would reduce its taxes because it would benefit from the experiment more
than most members of the treatment group. Suppose further that aside
from tax considerations, it makes no economic sense for A to acquire T.
If A could become subject to the alternative regime by merging with T,
the result would be an economically inefficient merger, plus a tax
windfall to A.
Further, status changes can complicate the goal of achieving revenue
neutrality. The multiplier that would be applied to T’s nominal tax
liability depends on T’s pre-experiment tax returns. But if T is suddenly
much larger after acquiring A and is paying far greater taxes, that would
have the effect of lowering the taxes of all treatment group taxpayers. The
average multiplier will be equal to the total tax liability of control group
taxpayers divided by the total nominal tax liability of treatment group
taxpayers, so increasing the denominator reduces the multiplier. This
would particularly be a problem if treatment group taxpayers are
systematically more likely to acquire other companies than control group
taxpayers. The reverse tendency would also create problems of
evaluation.
192. This doctrine prevents accrual method taxpayers from taking a deduction before they
have provided economic performance, such as delivering goods or services to the buyer. I.R.C.
§ 461(h) (West 2018). See generally 1 STEPHEN GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 4.04[3]
(2d ed. 1993 & Supp. Sept. 2018) (discussing economic performance rules).
193. Joseph J. Cordes & Harvey Galper, Tax Shelter Activity: Lessons from Twenty Years of
Evidence, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 305, 322 (1985) (describing that when capital gains rates are low,
investments often shift to activities generating capital gains).
194. Many other countries’ tax systems have very different treatment for income from capital
and income from labor. See, e.g., Klaus Sieker, Business Operations in Germany, B.N.A. TAX
MGMT. PORTFOLIO NO. 7140 ¶ IV.B.1 (2017) (discussing Germany’s special treatment of capital
income like dividends and interest); cf. I.R.C. § 64 (2012) (defining “ordinary income”).
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But tax law already deals with similar problems of status changes.195
Individuals’ divorces and corporations’ divisions are easy. If a married
couple is subject to an alternative tax regime and they get divorced, then
both ex-spouses should remain subject to the alternative regime. If a
corporation is subject to an alternative regime and divides, such as by
spinning off a business into a new corporation,196 then both the original
corporation and the spun-off company will remain subject to the
alternative regime.197 The model used to determine multipliers would be
generated based on the combined nominal tax of any spouses or pair of
companies that split up. Then, the multiplier would apply equally to each
spouse paying separately or to each entity.
Marriages and especially corporate mergers are more complicated. To
prevent marriages from affecting tax liability, the most straightforward
approach is to require all participants in an experiment to file
individually, whether as a single individual or as married filing
separately.198 This would be true even for control group taxpayers, to
facilitate the comparison between the control group and the treatment
group. The drawback of this approach is that eliminating the option to file
a joint return will be disadvantageous to some taxpayers. Although some
taxpayers suffer a “marriage penalty,”199 others enjoy a “marriage
bonus,”200 and under current U.S. tax law, people generally see the
married-filing-separately status as disadvantaged relative to the others,201
195. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 382 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (dealing with corporate tax attributes like
Net Operating Losses in the context of corporate acquisitions).
196. E.g., id. § 355 (providing tax rules for corporate separations like spin-offs, split-offs,
and split-ups).
197. Cf. 1 BORIS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 11.12 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. III 2018) (discussing how, in a corporate
separation under I.R.C. § 355, certain tax attributes are continued).
198. Some circumstances already exist where one spouse’s unusual tax situation bars a
married couple from filing joint returns, including one spouse using the calendar year as a taxable
year and the other spouse using a different taxable year, I.R.C. § 6013(a)(2) (2012), and one
spouse being a nonresident alien, id. § 6013(a)(1). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
148, ¶ 111.5.2 (discussing married-filing-jointly returns versus married-filing-separately returns
in depth). Moreover, filing separately sometimes allows taxpayers to get certain tax benefits that
would not be available (or not as available) if filing jointly. See id. (discussing how filing
separately can maximize the deduction under I.R.C. § 213(a)).
199. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, A Practical Solution to the Marriage Penalty, 44 PEPP. L.
REV. 647, 653–58 (2017) (providing statistics and history).
200. For a detailed statistical analysis of who receives a penalty and who receives a bonus
under current tax law, see Amir El-Sibaie, Marriage Penalties and Bonuses Under the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/tax-cuts-and-jobs-actmarriage-penalty-marriage-bonus/ [https://perma.cc/QRZ7-JV54].
201. See, e.g., Ryznar, supra note 199, at 655 (“Filing separately is, on average, not
advantageous because fewer credits and deductions are available, and the tax brackets are
narrower than those of single filers.”).
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with some exceptions.202 Thus, taxpayers might elect to participate in tax
experiments only if they are willing to forego this option. The best longterm solution might be for all taxpayers to file separately.203 While this
would be a significant change in U.S. law, most developed countries have
always had individual filing or have made this switch in recent
decades,204 and there are strong arguments that the United States should
switch as well.205 Of course, the United States might use a tax experiment
to determine whether to eliminate this option. Meanwhile, there is no
impediment to tax experimentation in countries with individual filing.
In corporate mergers,206 where the target company is subject to an
alternative regime but the acquiring company is not, there are two
possible options. First, the government may require the target to maintain
separate corporate form as the acquirer’s subsidiary207 and continue to
file its own separate tax return using the alternative tax regime, without
the option of consolidating its returns with the acquirer’s.208 So long as
the acquirer and the target remain legally separate entities, the accounting
is straightforward. A complication here is that the combined entities
might engage in transactions seeking to take advantage of the differential
tax treatment of the two entities. This problem is familiar to tax law,209

202. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, When ‘Married, Filing Separately’ Lowers Your Tax Bill,
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-married-filingseparately-lowers-your-tax-bill-1519381801 [https://perma.cc/PAC8-GPPJ].
203. But see Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185,
196–201 (2014) (suggesting more modest changes to tax law).
204. Fox, supra note 7, at 9–10.
205. See, e.g., id. at 48–49 (arguing that the current regime distorts couple’s marriage
decisions).
206. E.g., I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (defining the various types of reorganizations
available for the tax-free merger of two corporations).
207. There are a number of methods of tax-free acquisition already available that would
allow the target and acquirer to remain separate corporate forms, including “B” reorganizations
under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), forward triangular mergers under I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D), and reverse
triangular mergers under I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E).
208. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 148, ¶ 97.2 (describing consolidated
returns). The government has long limited the eligibility of subsidiaries to consolidate their returns
with their parent’s corporate group, see I.R.C. § 1504(b), and subsidiaries (e.g., Target in the
example above) subject to alternative tax regimes would simply be a new limitation. Nonconsolidation of returns would not lead to taxation of the subsidiary’s income at both the
subsidiary and parent corporation level, thanks to the dividends received deduction at I.R.C.
§ 243(a)(3).
209. Transfer pricing also may become an issue as the IRS seeks to limit the scope of passthrough income rules. See Kamin et al., supra note 2, at 22–23 (“[T]he IRS has had only very
limited success in preventing these kinds of transfer-pricing and other valuation games among
related parties in other contexts.”).
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with transfer pricing regulation seeking to ensure that transactions reflect
what parties would agree to in arms-length negotiations.210
Second, the government may allow the target to fully merge and
consolidate with the acquirer, but the combined corporation would have
to calculate its taxes once using the alternative regime and a second time
using the default regime. The actual tax liability would be a weighted
average of the two, in proportion to the relative value of the target and
acquirer at the time of the merger.211 The government would then use the
proportion of nominal tax liability attributable to the treatment group
entity in modeling the effects of the experiment more broadly. The
principal challenge with this approach is valuation. If the target and
acquirer are public corporations, then the government can use their
stocks’ market capitalization to determine valuation.212 In other
circumstances, the relative valuations might be a matter of dispute
between the tax authority and the taxpayer, as the taxpayer might seek a
larger or smaller capitalization based on which tax treatment seem more
attractive. The costs of such gaming are likely to be low, however, given
that the revenue-neutrality constraint is unlikely to make either option
much more attractive than the other. Nonetheless, the transactions costs
associated with arguing about valuation might discourage corporate
participation in experiments on relatively minor tax code provisions.
D. Externalities
Many tax provisions, such as business expense deductions,213 exist to
properly calculate taxpayer income.214 But other tax provisions are “tax
expenditures” that further some additional goal,215 such as creating
210. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (Supp. V 2018).
211. I.R.C. § 382(b)(1) uses an analogous regime to limit the use of tax attributes (like net
operating losses and built-in losses) of an acquired corporation in proportion to the value of the
acquired corporation. See generally 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 148, ¶ 14.42[3] (explaining
functioning of § 382’s limitations).
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2(a)(3)(i) (as amended in 1999) (providing that in calculating
“value,” control premiums or similar considerations are ignored).
213. E.g., I.R.C. § 162 (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
214. Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget
Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679, 679–80 (1976) (distinguishing “the
structural provisions necessary to the application of a normal income tax, such as the definition
of net income” from “special preferences found in every income tax”).
215. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its Denouement,
30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 136–38 (2010). But see Borris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax
Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 247 (1969) (criticizing the concept of
tax expenditures); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Commentary, Tax Expenditure
Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1661 (1992) (criticizing the same).
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positive externalities or reducing negative externalities.216 A potential
objection to tax tailoring is that allowing taxpayers to opt out of such
externality-addressing tax expenditures will adversely affect third parties.
For example, the R&D tax credit217 is often defended as encouraging
scientific research that will benefit society as a whole218 because
companies cannot appropriate the full value of their research efforts.219
Similarly, tax expenditures subsidizing higher education220 are justified
by its positive externalities.221 Other examples include the various
credits,222 deductions,223 and exclusions224 subsidizing energy efficiency
and clean energy, all of which are justified as reducing the negative
externalities from fossil fuels.225
One could make an argument for preventing alternative tax regimes
from removing such tax expenditures. Similarly, one could justify the
absence of some deductions on externality grounds. For example,
environmental considerations might justify the absence of a deduction or
exclusion for the cost of gas used commuting by car.226 Allowing
216. See infra notes 218–25 and accompanying text; see also Martin Feldstein, A
Contribution to the Theory of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Charitable Giving, in THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 99, 99 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (“[T]ax
incentives should be used to encourage charitable gifts that will promote the achievement of
desired social goals.”).
217. I.R.C. § 41 (2012 & Supp. V 2018); see also id. § 174 (allowing immediate deduction
for R&D expenditures, in contravention of the general principle of capitalization for expenditures
creating multi-year benefits).
218. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can a Patent Box Promote Advanced
Manufacturing?, 147 TAX NOTES 1347, 1348 (2015) (“[D]ecades of research by leading
economists indicates that externalities from R&D not only exist but are very large.”).
219. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 104 (Comm. Print 2012) (“[B]usinesses in
general are unlikely to invest in R&D in amounts consistent with its social returns.”).
220. E.g., I.R.C. § 25A(i) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); id. § 117 (scholarships); id. § 221
(deduction on student-loan interest); id. § 222 (deduction for qualified tuition); id. § 529
(education savings accounts); I.R.C. § 127 (2012) (exclusion for employer-provided educational
assistance).
221. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 219, at 633.
222. I.R.C. § 45 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (allowing credit for renewable energy generation,
as from wind).
223. Id. § 179D (allowing deduction for all or part of the cost of energy-efficient commercial
building property).
224. I.R.C. § 136 (2012) (allowing exclusion for energy conservation subsidies provided by
utilities).
225. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 219, at 113–53.
226. See Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation
Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 635–40 (2005) (discussing how the existing tax benefit for
employer-provided parking creates externalities, including more car-generated pollution and
congestion); Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1946) (denying deduction for commuting
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taxpayers to opt into such a deduction in exchange for higher tax rates
might reduce social welfare. Thus, the tax authority should hesitate to
offer a tax experiment that would eliminate for treatment taxpayers a tax
provision justified (or justifiable) based on its effects on others.
There may be some situations, however, in which concerns about
externalities could be addressed by changing the unit offered the
alternative tax regime. Consider, for example, the home-mortgage
interest deduction.227 The deduction’s defenders argue that it encourages
homeownership, producing positive externalities including better
maintained neighborhoods and greater social capital in neighborhoods.228
Allowing opting into an alternative tax regime without the homemortgage interest deduction (in exchange for lower rates) might then have
negative effects on neighborhoods.
A response to this problem would be to allow entire neighborhoods
(or entire collections of neighborhoods) to opt into such alternative
regimes. Specifically, the decisions to opt in could be made by a
homeowners’ association (HOA) or a municipality. This election would
“run with the land,” so that home mortgage interest could never be
deducted for a home within that HOA or municipality, but any taxpayer
principally residing in a home would benefit from the lower rates. The
opt-in is thus “in rem,” attaching to the property (that is, the homes),
regardless of whether it is subsequently transferred. Allowing the opt-in
to be done by the HOA or the municipality ensures that externalities are
internalized at the level making the decision to opt in. This would, of
course, require enabling legislation, above and beyond that needed for tax
experimentation in general.
Random assignment of some HOAs or municipalities that opt into a
control group would allow rigorous determination of whether the home
mortgage interest deduction produces the predicted neighborhood
benefits. In theory, the deduction should lead to more investment in
housing, so assuming the experiment includes at least some not-yetdeveloped land, one should expect that such land would be more likely
to be developed than corresponding land in the control group. Property
values similarly ought to be higher in areas with the deduction than
without, as those in the treatment group allocate more of their money to
non-house spending.229 Of course, if the primary goal of an experiment
expenses based on predecessor to I.R.C. § 262, which denies a deduction for personal, family, and
living expenses).
227. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D).
228. See KNIGHTLY, supra note 53 (reviewing literature on this matter). See generally
William M. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, in LOW-INCOME
HOMEOWNERSHIP 381 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002) (reviewing literature on
the social impacts of homeownership).
229. For a general argument that laws affect housing prices, see Anup Malani, Valuing Laws
as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2008).
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were informational, then a home mortgage interest deduction experiment
with individual subjects might be more effective. If the deduction truly
has externalities, then one should expect houses near those randomized
to the treatment of giving up the deduction to decline in value relative to
houses near those randomized to control.
The government also might be able to experiment with tax provisions
thought to provide positive externalities by defining a new treatment
group that is designed to promote externalities but in a different way. For
example, the government might consider replacing the R&D tax credit
with a system in which the government directly grants subsidies in the
form of tax credits to companies based on the quality of their research
proposals or the importance of research undertaken.230 Such an
experiment could still be revenue neutral. Taxpayers might be willing to
opt in, if they think they would benefit from greater tax benefits for more
important research, with reduced tax benefits for less important research.
The government might then seek to evaluate both whether the change is
attractive to taxpayers and whether the change indeed produces more
valuable research. As with assessing externalities from the homemortgage interest deduction, this analysis would require data beyond that
available from tax returns.
III. BEYOND REVENUE NEUTRALITY
This Article argues for revenue-neutral experimentation in part
because such experimentation entails little risk to taxpayers. It is possible,
however, to imagine more adventuresome experiments that would not
necessarily be revenue-neutral. Section III.A discusses the possibility that
participation might be subsidized, with participants on average paying
less tax than others. Section III.B suggests the possibility of non-revenueneutral experiments on tax rates to help assess the impact of taxation on
taxpayer behavior. The results of these or other experiments might
automatically lead to permanent changes in law, as discussed in Section
III.C’s analysis of self-executing experiments. Finally, Section III.D
assesses the possibility that tax experiment subjects might be states,
counties, or localities instead of individuals.
A. Participation Inducements
Perhaps the most significant challenge to tax experimentation is that
few taxpayers may agree to participate. Opting in to an experiment
requires some research into the tax law issue. Taxpayers also need to
assess the possibility of adverse selection. Once again, if the taxpayers
230. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (discussing the varieties of incentives governments can
provide for innovation, beyond just R&D tax credits).
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most likely to participate are those with private information that they
would gain greatly from a tax law change, then taxpayers who expect to
benefit only slightly with respect to their nominal tax liability should be
expected to lose money once revenue-neutral adjustments apply.
Above,231 this Article discussed one solution to adverse selection that
makes taxpayers hesitant to participate: designating an experiment optout or even mandatory. But it also recognized strong arguments against
such an approach to these strategies.
An alternative possibility would be for the government to offer
inducements to taxpayers willing to participate. All taxpayers who opt
into the experiment, or perhaps only those assigned to treatment, might
receive some tax discount (perhaps a small percentage discount on their
tax returns). Even relatively modest inducements might be sufficient to
overcome adverse selection problems. With such participation
inducements, tax experimentation would not be truly revenue neutral;
treatment group taxpayers would be promised that they would pay less
on average. The government would be sacrificing revenue for the
information to be obtained from a tax experiment. But taxpayers in the
treatment group would still be matched to control group taxpayers. This
has the useful effect of ensuring that taxpayers will be willing to
participate only if they believe that the tax changes will not overly distort
their own incentives.
The government might offer inducements for particular experiments,
but it also might offer inducements to taxpayers willing to participate in
a wide range of tax experiments. The government might simultaneously
execute a wide range of experiments on various tax issues. This can help
limit adverse selection. Because taxpayers will anticipate that the chances
of being randomized into the treatment group of any particular
experiment will be relatively low, participation is not likely to be limited
to taxpayers who expect to benefit disproportionately from that tax
experiment.
B. Experiments on Tax Rates
The government can also use participation inducements to facilitate
experiments on tax rates. Consider, for example, a tax experiment in
which some taxpayers will be randomly selected to pay an extra 2% in
taxes, while others receive a 3% discount on their taxes. The purpose of
such an experiment would be to assess the effect of the level of taxation
on other variables, such as taxpayer work effort and job creation. These
are among the most contentious issues in tax policy,232 but randomized
231. See supra Section II.A.
232. See generally Saez et al., supra note 18 (providing a review of the literature).
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studies have been unavailable233 and interpretive issues make it virtually
impossible to generalize from existing evidence about long-term effects
of marginal tax rate changes.234 An important question for policymakers
is whether higher tax rates reduce taxpayers’ willingness to work—that
is, whether the income or substitution effects of taxes dominate.235
Such experiments might produce greater objections than revenueneutral experimentation, because the horizontal inequities resulting are
greater. This is indeed a principal reason that this Article has focused on
revenue-neutral experimentation. Nonetheless, the possibility of such
experiments should not be dismissed, because they would produce a form
of data otherwise almost impossible to obtain. Moreover, this Article has
shown above that concerns about horizontal inequity may be overstated.
Taxpayers might purchase insurance against being randomized to the
group that receives a tax increase,236 with such insurance paying an ex
ante lump sum to such taxpayers. That would limit the experiments’
usefulness in providing insight into the effects of overall wealth on
individual behavior, but such experiments could still help identify
marginal incentive effects of government policy.
With revenue-neutral tax experiments, one can often consider an
experiment successful simply on the basis that informed taxpayers would
prefer the treatment group to the control group. With non-revenue-neutral
experiments, the mere existence of participating taxpayers cannot be a
strong argument in favor of the policy. Still, the government might
measure success based on the effects of the experiment. For example, if
an experiment demonstrated that taxpayers who suffered an increase in
the tax rate did not reduce work effort as measured by pretax income, or
even increased work effort, that would furnish an argument in favor of
increasing the tax rate. On the other hand, if an increase in the tax rate in
fact lowered tax revenues, that would indicate that the government was
233. Id. at 23 (“Although we refer in this section to income tax rate schedule changes as a
treatment, they certainly do not represent a classical treatment in which a random selection of
taxpayers is presented with a changed tax rate schedule, while a control group of taxpayers is not
so subject.”).
234. Id. at 43 (“Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income in the long run (i.e., exceeding
a few years) are plagued by extremely difficult issues of identification, so difficult that we believe
that there are no convincing estimates of the long-run elasticity of reported taxable income to
changes in the marginal tax rate.”).
235. The substitution effect suggests that workers will work harder with lower taxes,
substituting labor for leisure, while the income effect suggests that lower taxes may cause workers
to engage in more leisure because they have less need to work. See, e.g., LIBBY RITTENBERG &
TIMOTHY TREGARTHEN, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 309–13 (2009). If only marginal tax
rates change, then there should be no income effect, but virtually any tax reform will affect both
inframarginal and marginal tax rates.
236. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
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already on the wrong side of the Laffer Curve237 and that a tax increase
would not be advisable. Between these extremes, analysts might reach
different normative conclusions.
C. Self-Executing Tax Experiments
How should the tax authority decide whether to expand an experiment
when it shows some effects that would be generally viewed as beneficial
and some that would be generally viewed as harmful? And at what point
should the legislature make a tax provision permanent? These are
fundamentally political trade-offs that experimentation can produce
information about, but public officials ultimately must decide how to act
based on such information. But a legislature authorizing tax
experimentation could specify ex ante what the consequences of such an
experiment might be. For example, a legislature authorizing an
experiment on a tax increase might provide that the tax increase will be
applied to all taxpayers so long as the experiment establishes that a 1%
increase in tax leads to no more than a 0.5% decrease in work effort.
Such self-executing experiments238 can facilitate legislative
transparency and honesty. During the debate on the recent tax reform,
brief consideration was given to the possibility of a trigger that would
automatically increase tax rates if revenues fell short of projections, but
the Senate parliamentarian rejected the plan.239 The virtue of such a
trigger is that it punishes cheap talk. A legislator endorsing a tax cut can
make more credible the legislator’s claimed revenue projections by
agreeing to a trigger. But there are problems with such a trigger as well.240
Revenue may fall short of projections for exogenous reasons, such as a
recession. Moreover, increasing taxes would generally be a poor fiscal
policy response to a recession. Taxes generally fall during recessions, and
this “automatic stabilizer” may reduce the extent of the economic

237. See Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future, HERITAGE FOUND.
(June 1, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/the-laffer-curve-past-present-and-future
[https://perma.cc/FT4H-3THC] (discussing the curve, which postulates that tax revenues will be
zero at both 0% and 100% tax rates).
238. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 985–87 (discussing the possibility of selfexecution).
239. See Senate Republicans Scramble to Find Revenue for Tax Bill with Vote Expected
Friday, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/taxoverhaul-senate-debate.html [https://perma.cc/TXM4-GWHS].
240. Some of these problems are political. See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, Senate Leaders
Agree to Add Fiscal Trigger to Tax Reform Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/tax-reform/senate-leaders-agree-add-fiscal-triggertax-reform-bill/2017/11/29/1xcfm [https://perma.cc/E8PN-UCXU] (reporting Sen. Kennedy’s
reaction to the prospect of automatic tax increases).
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downturn.241 An experiment, however, can provide a better measure of a
policy’s effects, because the treatment group is compared to the control
group. Thus, if legislators favor a tax cut because they believe that it will
largely be self-financing, it might make sense for the tax cut initially to
be experimental, with the result of the experiment determining whether
they should make the tax cut permanent.
A reasonable objection is that it will be difficult to craft—in
advance—a measure that fully captures a tax experiment’s effects.
Legislators might hope that a tax cut not only will lead to more work
effort on the part of the recipients of the tax cut, but also greater job
creation by these individuals, who might be more likely to start or expand
businesses. Yet it will not always be straightforward to attribute job gains
and losses to particular taxpayers. The self-execution outcome might thus
depend on easily measured variables that may be proxies for broader
economic effects.
One form of a self-executing tax experiment might allow for tax law
to move in opposite directions depending on the result, for example with
a failed tax cut experiment leading to an automatic tax increase. Suppose
that legislators disagree about the effects of increasing taxes on the
wealthy, with more conservative legislators worrying that this will lead
the wealthy to work less hard and more liberal legislators taking the
opposite position. This is an empirical issue, and it is an empirical issue
to which an experiment is responsive. But many legislators seem unlikely
to change their positions even if an experiment provides powerful
evidence, but self-execution might force a policy result. Such a selfexecuting experiment might be easier to pass than an experiment that can
only move the law in one direction. If legislators on each side truly
believe that the experiment will vindicate their respective empirical
positions, then both sides should be eager to support such a self-executing
experiment. Meanwhile, a refusal to agree to such a self-executing
experiment may expose legislators who claim that a tax law change
would lead to a particular result but do not in fact believe this to be true.
D. Larger Experimental Units
Non-revenue-neutral experiments, whether self-executing or not, will
produce information about how individual taxpayers respond to changes
in tax law, such as increases or decreases in tax rates. But often, the
relevant question will be how these changes affect others. This Article
noted above that people might be interested in whether businesses
affected by a tax law change increase or decrease their hiring levels.
241. See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, Symposium, The Significance of
Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 21, 37 (discussing
automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy).
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Moreover, even when they are interested in taxpayer responses, that
information might not be clear from the taxpayers’ tax returns. For
example, an experiment might impose a tax penalty on taxpayers who fail
to purchase health insurance. The Affordable Care Act included such an
“individual mandate,”242 which the Supreme Court upheld as a tax,243 but
this individual mandate was removed in the most recent tax reform.244
Tax returns might tell whether a penalty leads more taxpayers to purchase
insurance, but it cannot provide information about how it affects these
taxpayers’ health.
A possible solution would be for tax experiments to occur at levels
greater than the individual taxpayer. This Article has already discussed
one example of this, the possibility of a revenue-neutral tax experiment
for the home mortgage interest deduction, where homeowners’
associations could decide to participate or not.245 Tax experiments also
might be executed at the level of a state, county, or locality. These
approaches might better indicate the effect of tax rates on hiring than an
experiment applying to individuals. It may be easy to obtain data on
business activity or economic growth in a region or for an industry, even
when it might be difficult to attribute that hiring to any particular
individual. Similarly, unless the government plans to start collecting
health information on tax returns, it may be more capable of evaluating
health statistics already collected at various levels of government.246
Such tax experiments reduce but do not eliminate the danger that a tax
experiment will simply shift economic activity.247 If a tax experiment
results in some individuals receiving a tax increase and others receiving
a tax decrease, then taxpayers may seek to take advantage of these
discrepancies. For example, a married couple filing separately248 might
seek to ensure that income appears on the tax form of the member of the
couple who enjoys the lower tax rate.249 Such games are more difficult to
play when a tax is applied to an entire city, county or state. There is,
242. See I.R.C. § 5000A (2012).
243. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 566 (2012).
244. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2018)) (“ELIMINATION OF SHARED
RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS FAILING TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.”).
245. See supra Section II.D.
246. The National Center for Health Statistics, for example, collects much relevant data. See
National Center for Health Statistics, CENTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/index.htm [https://perma.cc/F4EG-VBS6] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018)
(providing information on the Center).
247. See supra Section II.C.2.
248. I.R.C. § 1(d) (2012) (allowing married individuals to file a return that is not join with
his or her spouse).
249. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 108–09 (1930) (example of such an
arrangement).
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however, still a danger that economic activity may move across city or
state borders. At least on the margins, businesses will have incentives to
move activity from a location in a high-tax treatment group to a location
in a low-tax treatment group. Thus, tax experiments can produce
distortions. Moreover, tax experiment may give one business an
advantage over a competitor, making tax changes much more
consequential than if they were applied uniformly. This is problematic
also because it may lead to misinterpretation. But if experimental units
are sufficiently large, such effects may be relatively small, and
experiments of this sort may provide the best available evidence of the
effects of tax policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered a range of possible applications of tax
experimentation, from relatively small issues such as the entertainment
deduction to foundational questions about the effect of marginal tax rates
on labor supply and even the effect of tax policies on taxpayer health.
Perhaps one reason that the possibility of tax experiments has been
neglected is that it seems politically implausible that the government
would randomly assign taxpayers to different tax rates, let alone assign
different municipalities to different tax rules. This Article’s ambition has
been to show that more modest tax experimentation, featuring revenueneutral designs and voluntary participation, might sometimes be possible,
and that interpretive challenges can be addressed. Initial forays involving
discrete code provisions could lead to voluntary experiments in which
taxpayers receive some tax rate reward in exchange for their willingness
to being assigned to any of many tax treatments. Such a program could
increase the odds that the next great tax reform is based on a solid
foundation of evidence.
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